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LIFTING THE VEIL ON RIGOROUS 
RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY 
MIRANDA OSHIGE MCGOWAN* 
In many different cases, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
used a rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny very different from the 
ordinary, deferential rational basis scrutiny taught in constitutional law 
courses.  When invoked, this more rigorous form of rational basis 
scrutiny has proven fatal to statutes and regulations.  Many scholars and 
courts have described how courts apply it and have defended particular 
cases in which it has been used. No one, however, has explained just why 
and when courts will or ought to apply it.  This gap is troublesome and 
pressing.  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is an important part of the 
constitutional toolkit, and courts have increasingly applied it to a wide 
variety of circumstances—including same-sex marriage, adoption by gay 
men and lesbians, and intimate sexual relations. This term, the Supreme 
Court will be hearing argument on—and presumably deciding—two 
same-sex marriage cases.  Which level of scrutiny the Court applies to the 
laws challenged in these lawsuits will likely determine whether same sex 
marriage will be legal in California and whether the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act’s definition of marriage is constitutional.  The issue of 
same-sex marriage is one of the most important civil rights issues today, 
and these cases should be decided by principle, not by a judge’s personal 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School.  Many thanks to Larry 
Alexander, Carl Auerbach, Dale Carpenter, Guy Charles, Bill Eskridge, Dan Farber, 
Kenneth Karst, David McGowan, and Naomi Mezey for helpful comments and criticism.  I 
feel deep gratitude toward my mentor and dear friend, the late Phil Frickey, who also 
commented on this draft.  This article springs from the questions raised by his work with Bill 
Eskridge.  Phil’s friendship and example inspired—and inspires—me.  I dedicate this article to 
him. 
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preferences.  This article traces the history of rigorous rational basis  
scrutiny and shows that courts use it to protect groups from majority 
overreaching but do not want to invoke intermediate or strict scrutiny.  
That courts apply it to protect groups raises the question of what makes a 
group a group, not merely a collection of people who share a common 
interest or characteristic.  This article explains the conditions necessary 
and sufficient to distinguish groups.  Drawing on behavioral economics 
and psychology, it also explains why rigorous rational basis scrutiny is the 
right tool for protecting such groups from majority overreaching.  Indeed, 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny may be a more effective tool than 
intermediate or strict scrutiny for protecting group interests in the long 
term.  Unlike strict scrutiny, it does not effectively forbid majorities from 
regulating groups.  Instead, it gives group members a seat at the political 
table, which forces majorities to take groups and their members into 
account when making decisions and providing reasons for those 
decisions.  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny therefore reinforces 
democratic political processes by ensuring that minority group members 
are taken into account as members both of their group and of the polity, 
without depriving majorities of the right to govern the polity as a whole. 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 380 
II.    THE HISTORY OF RIGOROUS RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY ....... 388 
A. The Development of the Doctrine ............................................ 388 
B.  Homosexuality and Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny—
When Does a Law Restrict Acts, and When Does It Target 
a Group? ..................................................................................... 394 
III.  EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE ...................... 401 
A.  Here’s the Rub: All Laws Stigmatize and Restrict the 
Liberties of Groups .................................................................... 401 
B. Toward a Workable Distinction Between “Groups” and 
“Classifications” ......................................................................... 406 
1. Judges and Cases ................................................................. 406 
2. Legal Scholars’ Attempts to Describe “Groups” Fall 
Short ...................................................................................... 415 
IV.  THE COURT OUGHT TO PROTECT GROUPS WITH RIGOROUS 
RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY........................................................... 425 
A.  What Is a Group?  The Concept of Structural Groups .......... 425 
B.  Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is Not Too Little 
Protection Too Late ................................................................... 430 
C.  Inverting Carolene Does Not Pervert the Constitution .......... 433 
D. Nudges May Move Public Opinion and Public Policy 
08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
2012] LIFTING THE VEIL 379 
Further than Shoves ................................................................... 435 
E. Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is a Nudge Not a Shove ... 439 
F. Recent Cases Illustrating the Subtlety of Rigorous 
Rational Basis’s Nudge .............................................................. 443 
G. Strict Scrutiny Is a Shove That Can Provoke Backlash 
That Negates Constitutional Protection ................................... 451 
H. Conclusion: Nudges from Courts Can Be More Powerful 
than Shoves ................................................................................. 457 




08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
380 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:377 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This term the Supreme Court will be hearing argument on two cases 
that affect the constitutional rights of same-sex partners to marry.  The 
first is Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 the appeal from the Ninth Circuit 
decision that declared California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional.2  
Proposition 8 amended California’s constitution to limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples and overturned the California Supreme Court’s 
earlier ruling that the California Constitution gave gay men and lesbians 
the right to marry.3  The second is United States v. Windsor,4 the appeal 
from the Second Circuit decision that declared unconstitutional the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act’s (DOMA) definition of marriage as 
those unions between opposite-sex couples.5  DOMA denies federal 
benefits that accrue to marriage (such as social security survivors’ 
benefits) to same-sex couples who are legally married in their home 
states.  It precludes these couples from filing joint income tax returns, 
and it denies federal employees dependent benefits for their same-sex 
spouses.6 
The circuit courts in Hollingsworth and Windsor took different 
routes to arrive at the conclusion that these restrictions on the rights of 
same-sex partners were unconstitutional.  Windsor held that gay men 
and lesbians were a suspect group, and it used intermediate scrutiny to 
determine that DOMA was unconstitutional.7  The Supreme Court, 
however, has long avoided declaring new suspect classifications8 or new 
 
1. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
2. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
3. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 66–68 (Cal. 2009) (describing the history of 
Proposition 8 from its creation during the California Supreme Court’s proceedings in In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5, to its passage by ballot initiative on November 4, 2008). 
4. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9413 (Dec. 7, 2012).   
5. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-307, 2012 
U.S. LEXIS 9413; see Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
6. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
7. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 176; see Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
8. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985) (holding that persons with disabilities were not a 
suspect class because when “individuals . . . have distinguishing characteristics relevant to” 
state interests courts are, and should be, “very reluctant . . . to closely scrutinize legislative 
choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued”); 
 
08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
2012] LIFTING THE VEIL 381 
fundamental rights.9  Most likely it will decline to do so in these cases. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Hollingsworth provides a surer 
roadmap for a Supreme Court decision that upholds the rights of gay 
and lesbian couples.  There, the Ninth Circuit used a rigorous form of 
rational basis scrutiny to strike down California’s ban on same-sex 
marriage.10  The First Circuit also used this rigorous form of rational 
basis scrutiny in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health 
and Human Services to declare unconstitutional DOMA’s restrictive 
definition of marriage.11  (The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari 
in this case.)  Both the Ninth Circuit and First Circuit disclaimed that 
they were recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.12  
Instead, both claimed to strike down discrete restrictions on same-sex 
partners, nothing more. 
This stringent form of rational basis scrutiny has a curious history.  
Some lower courts have explicitly injected rigor into rational basis 
analysis to strike down laws because the law restricted the liberties of 
certain groups; such laws would have been upheld under more lenient 
conceptions of rationality.13  The Supreme Court, however, has never 
 
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976) (“[E]qual protection 
analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of a suspect class,” and a mandatory retirement age of 50 “involves neither 
situation.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to 
hold that indigent persons were a suspect classification because such a class has “none of the 
traditional indicia of suspectness”). 
9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (describing the right of same-sex 
partners to engage in intimate sexual conduct as a “protected” liberty interest, not a 
fundamental right); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (noting that the 
Court has “always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because 
guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended” and refusing to declare fundamental the right of terminally ill patients to end their 
lives); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (finding that the arguments in favor of education being 
deemed a “fundamental right” are “unpersuasive”). 
10. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (“While deferential, the rational-basis standard ‘is not a 
toothless one.’” (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976))).  
11. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 1. 
12. See id. at 8 (explaining that precedent does not “mandate[] that the Constitution 
require[] states to permit same-sex marriages”); Perry, 671 F.3d at 1082 (“There is no 
necessity in either case that the privilege, benefit, or protection at issue be a constitutional 
right.”). 
13. In addition to Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, and Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1, this trend can also 
be seen in cases such as Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).  See also 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) 
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squarely admitted—and indeed, has sometimes denied—that a rigorous 
form of rational basis scrutiny exists.14  But exist it does, whether or not 
the Court admits it: several Supreme Court decisions have squarely 
placed the burden on the government to justify a challenged legal 
restriction, while either purporting to apply the usual, deferential 
rational basis test or reciting that test.15  Unfortunately, the Court’s 
refusal to admit the existence of this form of scrutiny means that the 
Court has never explained what triggers it or what satisfies it.     
The Supreme Court most recently used rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny was in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court struck 
down Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy.16  Other examples include 
Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that forbade state and local governments from outlawing 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;17 City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, which struck down a city zoning regulation that 
required a special use permit before a group home for persons with 
mental disabilities could operate;18 Plyler v. Doe, which struck down 
Texas’s ban on school funding for illegal immigrant children;19 and 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, which struck down a 
federal regulation that denied food stamps to households that contained 
unmarried adults.20 
Lower courts have been injecting rigor into rational basis scrutiny as 
well.  As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit did so when it declared 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional,21 and the First Circuit did so when it 
struck down DOMA’s restrictive definition of marriage.22  The Ninth 
 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . . burdens personal relationships and 
exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and such “statutes have consistently 
failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)). 
14. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367–68 (2001).   
15. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 635–36 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528–29, 538 
(1973). 
16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
17. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36. 
18. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
19. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
20. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529, 538. 
21. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
 22. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
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Circuit also used rigorous rational basis scrutiny to vacate and remand a 
district court decision that had upheld “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”23  
Judges on the Eleventh Circuit have tussled over whether the standard 
should apply to laws preventing gay men and lesbians from adopting 
children24 or banning sex toys.25 
Two analytic moves characterize rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  As 
with strict and intermediate scrutiny, when the Court applies rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny it presumes that the legislation is 
unconstitutional.26  The state must prove that the law has a legitimate 
state purpose and that the classification furthers the state interest.27  As 
 
2012) (“Supreme Court equal protection decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported 
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant treatment and have limited the 
permissible justifications.” (emphasis added)). 
23. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Lawrence requires 
something more than traditional rational basis review and that remand [of the district court’s 
decision dismissing the plaintiff’s challenge to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’] is therefore 
appropriate.”). 
24. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (11th 
Cir. 2004).  In a dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Barkett, who would have 
declared unconstitutional the Florida law forbidding gay men and lesbians from adopting 
children, writes that she would have applied a more searching form of rational basis review.  
In this case, Judge Barkett explained, “the classification at issue . . . burdens personal 
relationships and exudes animus against a politically unpopular group.  Under these 
circumstances, statutes have consistently failed rational basis review.”  Id. at 1292 (Barkett, J., 
dissenting).  The panel, however, had used the deferential version of rational basis scrutiny.  
The panel explained that, under the “deferential standard [of rational basis review], a 
legislative classification ‘is accorded a strong presumption of validity,’ and ‘must be upheld 
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification.’”  Id. at 1277 (majority opinion) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)).  
25. Compare Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing district court’s decision that the sex toy ban was unconstitutional because there was 
no general liberty in sexual expression that justified any measure of heightened scrutiny), with 
Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1284 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
held that an interest in public morality is not a “legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that because the statute furthered “no legitimate 
state interest,” the statute must be declared unconstitutional); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 
(1982) (explaining that in order to be constitutional the statute must “further[] some 
substantial goal of the State”). 
27. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a 
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for 
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
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with strict and intermediate scrutiny, not all state interests suffice to 
discharge the state’s burden.  Moral objections to the group’s conduct or 
to the group itself,28 under-inclusive29 or over-inclusive30 justifications will 
not discharge the state’s burden. 
In contrast, under regular rational basis analysis the challenger, not 
the state, bears the burden of proof.  The challenger must “negative 
every conceivable basis which might support [the law].”31  The state has 
free rein to define its purposes.  Moral reasons alone defeat challenges 
to the legitimacy of the state’s interest—as Barnes v. Glen Theatre32 and 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.33 attest.  A bare assertion by the state that the 
classification furthers the state interest can defeat claims that the means 
a law employs fit poorly with its stated justification—as McGowan v. 
Maryland34 and United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz35 show.  
The Court generally defers to the state’s assertions about how the 
classification furthers the state’s purported interest, and it tolerates a 
 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985) (“[The city’s] concern with the possibility of a flood . . . can 
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston home [for persons with mental 
disabilities] and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or 
sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could be located on the Featherston site without 
obtaining a special use permit”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 (finding that barring undocumented 
alien children from public school is unconstitutional where “[t]here is no evidence in the 
record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy.  
To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, 
while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”). 
28. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216). 
29. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449. 
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that the Colorado constitutional 
amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
31. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
32. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). 
33. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 301–02 (2000) (upholding a statute 
prohibiting fully nude dancing similar to the statute in Barnes because it is sufficiently related 
to asserted governmental interests in morality). 
34. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450–52 (1961) (accepting at face value 
state’s justification that store-closing laws on Sunday, the traditional Christian day of 
Sabbath, provided citizens with a day of rest and recreation rather than arriving at the 
obvious conclusion, which is that such laws are based in sectarian, moral concerns). 
35. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177, 179 (1980) (upholding government 
board’s decision to eliminate dual, “windfall” retirement benefits for only one class of 
railroad retirees—those who had worked fewer than twenty-five years for a railroad and who 
were not currently connected with any railroad). 
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fair degree of both over- and under-inclusivity.36 
These analytic differences decide cases.  Regular rational basis 
scrutiny is scrutiny in name only, and laws virtually always survive its 
gaze.37  In every case in which courts have applied rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny, however, the added rigor has proved fatal to the challenged 
law.38 
Given that cases turn on whether rigorous or regular rational basis 
scrutiny is employed, it would be useful to know what criteria lead 
courts to opt for rigor.  The Court has never addressed what triggers the 
fatal form of rational basis scrutiny, however.  It has often tried to 
conceal that it is applying a heightened form of scrutiny.  Moreno39 and 
Cleburne40 parroted the regular rational basis standard, while at the 
same time shifting the burden of proof to the state and insisting on a 
tailored fit between the statute’s classification and purpose.  In Garrett, 
the Court’s majority opinion denied that Cleburne had applied anything 
 
36. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1949) (upholding 
ban on advertising trucks in New York despite significant over- and under-inclusivity). 
37. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9, 14 (1st. 
Cir. 2012) (“Equal protection claims tested by this rational basis standard, famously called by 
Justice Holmes the ‘last resort of constitutional argument,’ rarely succeed.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927))); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425–26 (“State 
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, 
in practice, their laws result in some inequality.  [As such, a] statutory discrimination will not 
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 724 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that it is “rare” that a 
law will ever fail rational basis scrutiny and citing only Romer v. Evans and City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. as exceptions to that rule); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as “minimal scrutiny in theory 
and virtually none in fact”). 
38. Some state courts have followed this lead.  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny also 
served as the basis for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision in Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–61, 968 (Mass. 2003), and as one basis for the 
San Francisco Superior Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases.  In re Coordination 
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4635, 2005 WL 583129, at *4–5 
(Cal. Superior Mar. 14, 2005), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/legal-
docs/downloads/in-re-marriage_ca_20050413_decision-ca-superior-court.pdf.  Both cases held 
unconstitutional state bans on same-sex marriage.  See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; In re 
Marriage Cases, No. 4635, 2005 WL 583129. 
39. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1973). 
40. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) 
(“[L]egislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
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but regular rational basis scrutiny.41  Both Lawrence and Romer 
sidestepped the issue of standard of review entirely while placing the 
burden of justifying the law on the state and condemning some state 
interests as irrational animus.42 
This article identifies and analyzes the circumstances that lead courts 
to inject rigor into rational basis analysis.43  This analysis rationalizes the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine and thus may provide guidance to judges and 
litigants operating in this quickly evolving area of law.  This article also 
breaks new ground in two areas.  First, it explains why and the 
conditions under which the Constitution should be read to provide to 
groups greater protection than it provides to persons not considered 
group members.  Second, drawing on the recent literature on “nudges,” 
it explains why rigorous rational basis scrutiny, rather than intermediate 
or strict scrutiny, has been the appropriate response to the 
discriminations experienced by gay men and lesbians, persons with 
 
41. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).  
42. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996).  To the extent the Court has said 
anything on this topic it has limited the scope of scrutiny by fiat.  Lawrence, for example, 
holds that gay men and lesbians have the right to pursue same-sex relationships free of 
criminal stigma.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  This holding could imply a 
principle of relational autonomy that commits the Court to striking bans on same-sex 
marriage.  The majority, however, declares that the principle applied in Lawrence extends no 
further than the sexual privacy rights of gay men and lesbians.  See id. 
43. Others have ably documented both rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s existence and 
strength.  See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause 
and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model 
and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 233 (2002) (“In some cases, a 
‘third-order’ rational review is also used by the Court[, and] . . . in these cases the burden 
shifts to the government to prove that the governmental action is constitutional.”); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1264–65 (2008) (“[T]he equal 
protection context, [the Court] has sometimes required ‘rationality with bite’ in place of the 
traditional rationality test.” (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–33; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–42, 
447; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982))); Calvin Massey, The Constitution in a Postmodern 
Age, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 194–96 (2007) (describing how the Court has refused to 
accept as true the state’s stated purpose for the law and searched for the “actual purpose”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (1996) 
(arguing that “[i]n a handful of cases, rationality review has actually meant something” (citing 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35)).  As a result, 
this article will not dwell on the Court’s implausible denials to the contrary.  But see Daniel 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (1996) (“We 
would like to explore a third possibility: that the [Romer] majority was correct to invalidate 
the law without using heightened scrutiny.”). 
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disabilities, illegal aliens, and hippies.44  It also explains how these two 
circuit court cases exemplify the best kind of “nudge” and are likely to 
be upheld by the Supreme Court.45 
This article will proceed as follows.  Part II demonstrates how the 
Court’s conclusion that a group has been the target of discrimination 
triggers rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  Part III shows that previous 
attempts to define groups for the purpose of constitutional protection do 
not work in this context.  Part IV provides an alternative understanding 
that both makes sense and fits the case law better than competing 
explanations.  Part V explains why protecting groups and treating them 
as the unit of analysis is desirable and why rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny for restrictions on most 
groups. 
This analysis yields three important conclusions.  First, it is pointless 
to ask, “What is a group?” without also asking, “Why do you care?”  
What counts as a group depends on the purposes served by extending 
constitutional protection to groups.  Efforts to create universal 
principles for constitutional protection, such as “discreteness and 
insularity,” will always prove unsatisfactory because guaranteeing the 
equal protection of the laws to different groups of people require 
protections from different kinds of harm.  The context of heightened 
rational basis scrutiny suggests that the definition of groups under this 
doctrine will be a function of the reasons why animus against groups is 
distinct from moral disapproval of certain conduct. 
Second, the Court’s substantive due process and equal protection 
jurisprudence may be reconciled with the leading normative 
justifications for the Court’s power to strike legislation.  These doctrines 
have been persuasively attacked as inconsistent with the leading 
normative justification for the Court’s power to negative legislation—
John Hart Ely’s theory of representation reinforcement.46  This paper 
resolves this apparent inconsistency.  The Court has used rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny to protect groups when they are particularly 
vulnerable to political backlash based on beliefs about a group’s lesser 
 
44. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000).   
45. See id. 
46. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 54 (1994) (arguing that “the Court's equal protection jurisprudence has 
shown an  ‘inverted Carolene’ quality”). 
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moral worth that is likely to indefinitely cement a group’s subordinate 
status. 
Third, rigorous rational basis scrutiny can be defended as enhancing 
democratic values.  Unlike strict scrutiny, rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny is not a trump card that can be played to insulate a group 
generally from group-based restrictions.  Instead, it is a thin measure of 
constitutional protection.  It requires others to tolerate the group’s 
existence and engage them in rational political debate about the costs 
and benefits of laws that restrict group members’ ability to exercise 
liberties and privileges that are generally available to others.  Ironically, 
this thin measure of protection can prove to be more effective in 
increasing the rights of such groups by avoiding the kind of political and 
social backlash that harsher medicine like strict scrutiny can provoke. 
II. THE HISTORY OF RIGOROUS RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY 
A. The Development of the Doctrine 
Since its debut in United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno47 rigorous rational basis scrutiny has protected some groups 
from discriminatory treatment by the state.  Moreno arose when, in the 
late 1960s, Congress denied food stamps to individuals who lived in 
households with other unmarried, unrelated adults.48  The law’s target 
was clear: Congress did not want hippies in communes to live off the 
government’s largesse.49  The Court struck down this food stamp 
restriction, purportedly on rational basis grounds.  The Court held: 
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by 
reference to this congressional purpose.  For if the constitutional 
conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it 
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.  As a result, “[a] purpose to discriminate 
against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to 
[some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify 
 
47. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534, 538 (holding that, despite the multiple reasons given by 
the Government, the food stamp exclusion was still “without any rational basis” because it 
did not “further some legitimate governmental interest”). 
48. Id. at 529. 
49. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.)); 116 CONG. REC. 
44,439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Spessard Holland). 
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the 1971 amendment.50 
The Court uses the word “legitimate”—a rational basis concept—but 
its use is misleading.51  Under standard rational basis analysis, this 
restriction on food stamps would have been easily upheld.  Laws satisfy 
rational basis if “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify” a law, regardless whether that “reasoning . . . in fact underl[ies] 
the legislative decision.”52  Congress could permissibly solve just part of 
the problem of hunger and distinguish among subclasses of low-income 
people.53  It might have concluded, as the appellate brief argued, that 
including households comprised of unmarried, unrelated adults could 
facilitate food stamp fraud.54  It could rationally posit that households 
comprised of unmarried adults are more likely to move or break up than 
households made up of married couples or relatives.55  Such households 
also might skirt income restrictions more easily by concealing financial 
support from parents.56  These concerns are at least as plausible as New 
York City’s supposed concern, accepted by the Court in Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, that vehicles bearing advertisements 
would distract other drivers and pedestrians from safe passage on city 
streets and sidewalks and create worrisome levels of noise and visual 
pollution.57 
The rational basis doctrine does no work in Moreno.58  Rather, the 
critical language is “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
 
50. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (alterations in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting 
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
51. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
52. See Brief for the Appellants at 11–12, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973) (No. 72-534), 1973 WL 173826, at *6 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 
(1970); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). 
53. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (holding 
that regulation of only some of the causes of traffic distractions was allowable because equal 
protection does not require that “all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all”). 
54. See Brief for the Appellants, supra note 52, at 14–15. 
55. See id. at 16. 
56. See id.  
57. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 107, 110 (stating that the city’s conclusion that 
“advertising vehicle[s]” should be regulated because of the noise and traffic problems they 
cause is “an allowable one” even though city regulation left untouched “even greater ones . . . 
such as the vivid displays on Times Square”).   
58. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–36, 538 (1973) (analyzing 
Congressional justification for the 1971 amendment to the food stamp law and dismissing all 
reasons given as being “wholly without any rational basis”).  
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group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”59  Here, the 
plaintiffs showed that Congress objected to supporting commune-
dwelling hippies.60  Conjectures about other conceivable purposes 
Congress could have had in mind could not dispel the evidence that “a 
bare . . . desire to harm “hippies spurred Congress to impose the food 
stamp restriction.61  Only proof that another reason, free of group 
animus, actually impelled Congress’s restriction could dispel that 
conclusion.62  Consequently, the Court shifted the burden of justifying 
the restriction to the government.63  The government thus had to prove 
that, aside from disapproval of hippies and the hippie lifestyle, some 
additional reason genuinely accounted for the food stamp restriction.64  
The government could not produce some other genuine reason for 
Congress’s restriction, so the law failed.65 
The Court next used heightened rational basis scrutiny in Plyler v. 
Doe to strike a Texas law that prohibited school districts from admitting 
undocumented alien children or using state funds to educate them.66  It 
would have sufficed under regular rational basis scrutiny for the state to 
assert that it restricted illegal aliens in order to husband scarce 
 
59. Id. at 534 (first emphasis added). 
60. See Brief for Appellees at 19–20, Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (No. 72-534).  The brief for 
the appellees highlighted the few pieces of evidence from the legislative history indicating 
that the restriction was targeted at hippies and communes.  Id.  First, the Chair of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee and another Senator on the Conference Committee explained that 
excluding “hippy communes” was the purpose of the restriction.  Id. at 19.  Second, several 
members of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs later bemoaned 
that the “‘the so-called “anti-hippie commune” provision’ . . . was being used to cut off 
families ‘who might happen to have “taken in” a friend out of kindness.’”  Id. at 19 n.9 
(quoting 117 CONG. REC. 14,027 (1971) (letter from Sens. Henry Bellmon, Marlow Cook, 
Robert Dole, Charles Percy, Richard Schweiker, and Robert Taft, Jr., to Secretary Clifford 
Hardin)).  Finally, one other piece of evidence exists—the Statement of Managers on the Part 
of the House included in the Conference Report explains that the restriction was intended to 
“prohibit food stamp assistance to communal ‘families’ of unrelated individuals.”  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
61. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
62. See id. at 534–35. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. at 538.  Such a reason was not difficult to produce as Congress could have 
worried quite rationally that such households could commit fraud more easily, as individual 
members of the household might each be receiving support money from their parents that 
went unreported.  Had the Court been in its usual deferential rational basis frame of mind, it 
surely could have drummed up this reason or a similar one. 
66. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 229–30 (1982). 
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educational resources and enhance educational opportunities for Texas 
citizens and legal aliens and to discourage the migration of illegal aliens 
to Texas.67  Illegal aliens, like hippies, are not a suspect class, and 
education is not a fundamental right.68  Just as zero plus zero equals 
zero, usually states have a free hand to regulate an unprotected class’s 
unprotected rights.69 
The Plyler Court did its math differently.  Under the “new math” of 
heightened rational basis scrutiny, Texas’s flimsy assertions did not 
justify its restriction.70  As the Court saw it, Texas’s restriction on illegal 
alien children did not save all that much money.71  Texas also failed to 
prove how excluding undocumented children either improved education 
for other students or discouraged illegal migration to Texas.72  Excluding 
these children from public school, however, did ensure their illiteracy 
and condemn them as permanent outsiders in America.  Grim 
consequences, indeed, though perhaps Texas’s policy should not have 
gotten all the blame.  Undocumented alien children already were and 
would remain outsiders.  Federal law, not Texas law, forbade their 
presence in the United States, making them outsiders and pushing them 
to the margins of society.73  Learning to speak, read, and write English in 
Texas schools would not change this legal status. 
Plyler’s heightened rational basis scrutiny bit even harder than 
Moreno’s.  Texas demonstrated some cost savings and some benefits to 
its educational system.74  It estimated that the Houston public schools 
alone enrolled between 4210 and 5625 undocumented alien children at a 
cost between $500 and $700 per child per year.75  Many schools were 
tremendously overcrowded76 and thousands of students attended school 
 
67. See id. at 228–30. 
68. See id. at 223. 
69. See id. at 216–17. 
70. Id. at 230.  
71. Id. at 229–30. 
72. Id. at 228–29. 
73. Id. at 223. 
74. In contrast, in Moreno, the Government did not argue that denying food stamps to 
an entire class of people would save the government money.  See generally U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  That it would save money was obvious and perhaps 
offering that as a justification would have been tautological. 
75. Brief for the Appellants at 8, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538 & 80-
1934), 1981 WL 389967, at *6. 
76. Id. at 10. 
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in small, stifling portable classrooms because voters refused to approve 
school bonds and tax increases.77  Keeping illegal immigrant children out 
of its schools would save Texas over $2 million per year and alleviate at 
least some overcrowding.  Such evidence would have easily satisfied 
regular rational basis scrutiny,78 but it was not enough to discharge 
Texas’s burden under this more rigorous form.79 
In fact, Plyler’s rigorous rational basis scrutiny has more in common 
with the heightened scrutiny that the plurality applied in Frontiero v. 
Richardson,80 one of the early sex discrimination cases.  There, the 
plurality rejected the government’s reasons for its requirement that 
married women in the armed services prove that their husbands were 
dependent on them before they were eligible to receive increased 
housing allowances and medical and dental coverage for their spouses; 
married men in the armed services automatically received these 
benefits.81  This practice, just like Texas’s, saved the government money 
over a requirement that automatically granted these benefits to all 
married members of the armed services.82 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny also doomed a city zoning restriction 
that blocked Cleburne Living Center, a group home for persons with 
mental disabilities, from opening in a neighborhood in the city of 
Cleburne.83  A city ordinance required special use permits for homes for 
 
77. Id. at 6–7. 
78. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9, 14 (1st Cir. 
2012) (observing that Congress’s belief that a program would save the government money 
would satisfy traditional rational basis scrutiny, even if it turned out that Congress 
miscalculated). 
79. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24; see also Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9, 14 (observing that 
when the desire to husband scarce resources “is drawn against a historically disadvantaged 
group and has no other basis, Supreme Court precedent marks this as a reason undermining 
rather than bolstering the distinction” (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 
533–36 (rejecting the government’s contention that avoiding food stamp fraud justified the 
restrictions on eligibility). 
80. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (explaining that the 
classification in question can only be upheld if the government can demonstrate with 
“concrete evidence” that the differential treatment saves money). 
81. Id. at 690–91. 
82. Cf. id. at 689 (holding that to justify its differential treatment of women, the 
government would have to prove something impossible:  that its current scheme of granting 
benefits automatically to married men saved it more money than a gender neutral scheme 
that would require both men and women to prove a spouse’s dependency to be eligible for 
extra benefits). 
83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (reasoning 
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“the insane or feeble-minded,” “alcoholics,” and “drug addicts,” and it 
had denied one to Cleburne Living Center.84  City law, however, 
permitted fraternity houses, hospitals, and old-folks’ homes in this 
neighborhood without special permits.85 
People with mental disabilities were not a suspect category, the 
Court held.86  The Court recited the rational basis test, but it scrutinized 
the City’s action more closely.87  The City denied the permit because it 
worried about the “negative attitudes” of nearby property owners and 
of students at a nearby junior high school,88 and about possible injuries 
to the home’s residents in the case of a flood.89  Fraternity houses, 
hospitals, and nursing homes could certainly provoke the same 
concerns, but the City permitted them, and rational basis analysis often 
tolerates under-inclusive regulations.90  In this case, though, the Court 
held that under-inclusivity proved that the city had violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.91  Fraternity houses, hospitals, and nursing homes 
could also drive down property values, and their residents would be as 
vulnerable as persons with mental disabilities in the event of a flood.92  
Yet the City put no restrictions on these establishments.93  City concerns 
about the neighborhood’s negative attitudes toward Cleburne Living 
Center merely proved the City’s “irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded.”94  Echoing Moreno, the Court concluded that 
nothing more than “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group” drove the City’s restriction.95 
The Court’s opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick demonstrates the force 
 
that because the City cannot justify its view that mentally retarded individuals cannot live in 
crowded conditions while others can the ordinance is an “irrational prejudice”).  
84. Id. at 436–37 & n.3. 
85. Id. at 474–75. 
86. Id. at 442–43, 446. 
87. Id. at 442, 446. 
88. Id. at 448–49. 
89. Id. at 449 (noting that the home was situated on a “five hundred year flood plain”). 
90. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (“It is no 
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at 
all.”).   
91. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449. 
92. See id. at 450. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 447 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
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of rigorous rational basis scrutiny in Moreno, Plyler, and Cleburne.96  
Just one year after Cleburne, the Court held that Georgia’s ban on 
homosexual sodomy easily met rational basis scrutiny, though Georgia 
offered no reasons besides moral disapproval of gay men and lesbians.97  
Let me turn now to discussing that case and the cases that ultimately 
overruled it. 
B. Homosexuality and Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny—When Does a 
Law Restrict Acts, and When Does It Target a Group? 
The previous section showed how rigorous rational basis scrutiny 
forces states to justify the rationality of treating one group of persons 
differently than others.  For some groups, then, the Court has created a 
prima facie freedom from government regulation.98  Not all groups or 
classifications possess this prima facie right.  Soon after Cleburne, the 
Court heard Mr. Hardwick’s claim that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law 
violated his liberty to engage in private, intimate conduct within his 
home without due process law.99  He had been arrested in his bedroom 
for having sex with another man.100  (He did not claim that the law 
violated his equal protection rights, though Georgia conceded that it 
would not enforce the law against married, heterosexual persons.)101 
The Court reviewed Georgia’s anti-sodomy law under regular 
rational basis scrutiny.  Mr. Hardwick bore the burden of establishing 
the law’s illegitimacy.102  The Court characterized Mr. Hardwick’s 
argument that his arrest violated his privacy and liberty rights as 
 
96. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that “the presumed belief 
. . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” satisfies rational basis review, and 
therefore, the Georgia law is constitutional), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 
578 (2003). 
97. Id. 
98. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
99. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.  
100. Id. at 187–88.  
101. See id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that while Hardwick’s standing 
may rest on the state’s unequal enforcement of the law, his claim “involves an 
unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right of intimate association”). 
102. See id. at 196 (majority opinion).  The Court reasoned that there was no history and 
tradition of such a right because laws prohibiting sodomy had “ancient roots.”  Id. at 192.  
The common law had criminalized it; all of the original thirteen states had forbidden it at the 
time they ratified the Bill of Rights, and “until 1961, all 50 states [had] outlawed sodomy.”  Id. 
at 192–93. 
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“facetious.”103  No fundamental right to engage in “homosexual sodomy” 
existed.104  The law easily met regular rational basis scrutiny even though 
Georgia had no reason to restrict homosexual sodomy “other than the 
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”105  Morality was just 
fine by the Court: “The law . . . is constantly based on notions of 
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy 
indeed.”106 
Both Bowers and Cleburne reviewed restrictions on the rights of a 
non-suspect class, but Bowers’s brand of rational basis could not have 
been more different than Cleburne’s.107  Georgia’s moral objections to 
the conduct of gay men and its concerns about the spread of AIDS and 
Hepatitis108 satisfied the rational basis standard.  The City of Cleburne’s 
fears about persons with mental disabilities, however, did not.  Fears 
about persons with disabilities were just impermissible group animus, 
and they doomed the regulation. 
Bowers was not the last word on gay men, lesbians, rational basis 
scrutiny, and the Constitution, of course.  Ten years later, the Court 
struck down a 1992 Colorado constitutional amendment that forbade 
the State of Colorado and local governments from enacting laws aimed 
at protecting people from sexual orientation discrimination.109  
Amendment 2 meant that if gay men and lesbians wanted legal 
protection from sexual orientation discrimination, they would have to 
amend the state constitution.110  Colorado tried to downplay the effect of 
Amendment 2: it just “put[] gays and lesbians in the same [legal] 
position as all other persons.”  After all, people may freely discriminate 
 
103. Id. at 194. 
104. Id. at 196. 
105. Id.   
106. Id.  
107. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding that moral justifications satisfy rational 
basis scrutiny), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 
(1985) (holding that a legitimate governmental purpose must be behind discriminatory 
statutes and that “bare . . . desire to harm” unpopular groups does not suffice) (citing U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).  
108. Brief of Petitioner at 37, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667939, 
at *17.   
109. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 627, 635–36 (1996). 
110. Id. at 627 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284–85 (Colo. 1993)). 
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against one another on any basis except for special, prohibited bases, 
such as race, sex, national origin, religion, and color.111 
The Court would have none of that.  Amendment 2 “deni[ed] . . . 
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense” by making it 
harder “for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the 
government.”112  This hostility to Colorado’s characterization of the law 
set the tone for the rest of the Court’s analysis. 
The Court never stated the standard of review that it was applying, 
but it appeared to place the burden of proving the law’s rationality and 
legitimacy squarely on Colorado.  Amendment 2, Colorado argued, was 
meant to protect the rights of religious persons and to preserve scarce 
state resources for fighting more pressing kinds of discrimination.113  
These reasons did not justify the law, the Court held, because 
Amendment 2 bore no “rational relationship” to these interests.114  The 
breadth of the legal disability imposed by the amendment on gay men, 
lesbians, and bisexuals was completely “discontinuous with the reasons 
offered for . . . the amendment.”115  So discontinuous, the Court found 
that only “animosity” toward gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals could 
explain it.116  Animus towards a group is never a “legitimate” reason for 
state regulation.117  “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean 
that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”118 
The Court’s analysis in Romer tracks Cleburne, Moreno, and Plyler, 
not Bowers.119  Colorado could not make it harder for gay men and 
 
111. See id. at 626 (“[T]he State says[] the measure does no more than deny 
homosexuals special rights.”). 
112. Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
113. Id. at 635. 
114. Id. at 632. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. at 634. 
117. Compare id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) 
(“[D]esire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the “belief of a 
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” 
constitutes a rational, legitimate state interest), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578 (2003). 
118. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting 
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
119. Compare id. at 635 (ruling that Amendment 2 and the rationale given for it neither 
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lesbians to get anti-discrimination laws passed because some objected to 
homosexuality for religious reasons, while Georgia could arrest and jail 
gay men because some believed same-sex sodomy was immoral. 
Was Bowers’s regular rational basis the exception and the rigorous 
rational basis of Romer, Cleburne, Plyler, and Moreno the rule for 
discrimination against groups?  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
answered that question in the affirmative.120  John Lawrence and Tyron 
Gardner were charged and convicted under a Texas state law 
prohibiting same-sex sodomy after police said that they discovered them 
having consensual sex in Mr. Lawrence’s bedroom.121  Lawrence struck 
down that law, holding that bans on same-sex sodomy and bans against 
sodomy more generally between consenting adults violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.122 
Lawrence said nothing about the standard of review.  The Court’s 
reasoning, however, hewed to the rigorous rational basis review cases: 
the State of Texas, not the challengers, shouldered the burden of 
justifying the law, and an interest in morality could not discharge that 
burden.123  The Court concluded that the law was unconstitutional 
because it invaded liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.124  Griswold v. Connecticut,125 Eisenstadt v. Baird,126 Roe v. 
Wade,127 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
 
state nor are sufficiently related to a legitimate state interest), with City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (holding that a legitimate 
governmental purpose must be behind discriminatory statutes and that “bare . . . desire to 
harm” unpopular groups does not suffice (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)), Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the State’s goal of lowering education costs did not suffice 
as “further[ing] some substantial state interest”), Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538 (holding that every 
law need not “be drawn with precise ‘mathematical nicety’” but that any reasons the state 
gave for the food stamp law revision were “imprecise” and “wholly without any rational 
basis” (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970))), and Bowers, 478 U.S. at 
196 (holding that the “belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual 
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” constitutes a rational legitimate state interest). 
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 577–78 (2003). 
121. Id. at 562–63; DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF 
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, at xi–xii (2012).   
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
123. Id. at 577–78. 
124. Id. at 578. 
125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
126. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972). 
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973). 
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Casey128 were the most relevant precedents to this case—not Bowers.129  
These cases established that individuals were free to have private sexual 
relationships without government interference, even with same-sex 
partners.  The Court explained: 
[A]dults may choose to enter [into sexual relationships] in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons.  When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct 
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. 
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this choice.130 
On this basis, the Court held that laws prohibiting same-sex sodomy 
and laws prohibiting sodomy more generally violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
Standing Bowers’s reasoning on its head, the Court also concluded 
that Texas’s moral objections to same-sex sodomy compounded the 
constitutional violation.132  Prohibiting an activity because the state 
deems it immoral and deviant inevitably stigmatizes and demeans the 
people who engage in it.  Gay men and lesbians, like people with mental 
disabilities133 and illegal immigrant children,134 have the right not to be 
made into legal or social outsiders. 
 
128. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 877, 893–95 (1992). 
129. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–79 (2003) (discussing at length why Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey control, rather than Bowers). 
130. Id. at 567. 
131. Id. at 578.  Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy had an additional flaw, because it 
deprived gay men and lesbians of the equal protection of the laws. 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important 
respects . . . .  When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. 
Id. at 575. 
132. See id. at 578. 
133. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding 
that excluding mentally retarded individuals from certain areas constitutes an irrational 
prejudice against that group of individuals). 
134. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a statute denying immigrant 
children access to free public education isolates a “discrete group of innocent children” and 
without a substantial state interest the statute is unconstitutional).  
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In sum, several different Supreme Court cases have forbidden states 
from restricting the rights or liberties of some groups based solely on the 
community’s moral distaste for some conduct that is closely associated 
with some particular group or out of dislike for or disapproval of the 
group itself.  This burden of proof inverts rational basis scrutiny.  Under 
that test, challengers (here the affected groups) shoulder the Herculean 
task of proving a negative—that the state’s regulation serves no purpose 
at all, including the moral welfare of the citizenry.135  In contrast, when 
states regulate rights or liberties of some groups, states must, at a 
minimum, prove that the exercise of these rights or liberties—generally 
or when exercised by members of this group—cause some identifiable 
harm to the persons or property of third parties.136 
In essence, by reversing the burden of proof ordinarily employed in 
rational basis scrutiny, rigorous rational basis scrutiny forces the state to 
treat these groups as members of the political community.  These groups 
have a prima facie right to exist and a prima facie right to exercise rights 
and liberties that are generally available to others.  These prima facie 
rights attach to individuals, without regard to their membership in a 
group or class, but their membership in a group is relevant to the extent 
that they cannot be singled out for disadvantageous treatment by reason 
of that membership.  The state can only rebut this prima facie right by 
proving that group members’ exercise of some right or liberty actually 
harms the persons or property of third parties.  Fears that a group’s 
activities might cause some harm will not do.  The state must act 
dispassionately and based on proof that the group and its activities do or 
will cause some harm to third parties.  The state must also establish that 
lesser restrictions or generally applicable restrictions cannot avoid those 
harms. 
Recent circuit court decisions regarding the rights of gay men and 
lesbians have identified discrimination against certain social groups as 
the key factor triggering rigorous rational basis scrutiny.137  The circuit 
judges have echoed the Court’s suspicion about singling out groups for 
disfavored treatment and applied rigorous rational basis scrutiny.138  
 
135. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text. 
136. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 572, 578 (2003); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 228. 
137. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 
2012); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
138. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11; Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089. 
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First, discussing the line of cases running from Moreno to Lawrence, the 
First Circuit observed, “[T]he Supreme Court has now several times 
struck down state or local enactments without invoking any suspect 
classification.  In each, the protesting group was historically 
disadvantaged or unpopular, and the statutory justification seemed thin, 
unsupported or impermissible.”139 
The First Circuit concluded that through these cases the Court has 
tightened up rational basis scrutiny: “The Court has in these cases 
undertaken a more careful assessment of the justifications than the light 
scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review.”140 
Second, in Witt v. Department of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded a district court’s decision upholding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy for reconsideration because the district court had upheld 
the policy under traditional deferential rational basis review.141  The 
court wrote, “We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in 
Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational 
basis review[,]” and so “something more than traditional rational basis 
review” must apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation.142 
Finally, Perry v. Brown also tightened up rational basis scrutiny 
because California’s Proposition 8 withdrew “a privilege or protection 
. . . from a class of disfavored individuals.”143  When a law burdens such a 
group, rational basis scrutiny is not “toothless” and requires that the 
restriction “must find some footing in the realities of the subject.”144  
Moral disapproval of the group and its practices does not satisfy this 
burden.145  The Perry court concluded, “we must infer from Proposition 
8’s effect on California law that the People took away from gays and 
lesbians the right to use the official designation of ‘marriage’—and the 
societal status that accompanies it—because they disapproved of these 
 
139. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10. 
140. Id. at 11. 
141. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 820–22 (9th Cir. 2008). 
142. Id. at 816–17; see also Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 
F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . . 
burdens personal relationships and exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and 
such “statutes have consistently failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)). 
143. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1085. 
144. Id. at 1089 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 321 (1993)). 
145. Id. at 1092–93. 
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individuals as a class.”146  The majority’s disapproval of gay men and 
lesbians rendered Proposition 8 unconstitutional. 
III. EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE 
Though the results of the cases are clear enough, the reasoning 
behind them is not.  What are the foundations of rational basis review?  
The Court’s rigorous rational basis cases seemingly have presumed that 
it is self-evident when a law targets a group.  This next part will 
demonstrate that it is incorrect to presume that the existence of a group 
is self-evident.  Instead, the conclusion that a group exists is a conclusion 
that must be justified relative to the laws at issue in particular cases and 
the purposes served by rigorous exercise of rational basis analysis more 
generally. 
A. Here’s the Rub: All Laws Stigmatize and Restrict the Liberties of 
Groups 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence nailed this problem on the 
head—all criminal laws stigmatize the prohibited conduct and by 
extension stigmatize people who do the prohibited act.147  That the Court 
considered this kind of stigma unconstitutional in Lawrence led Justice 
Scalia to believe that the Court had adopted the harm principle.148  
Justice Scalia’s conclusion is too quick.  This part will explain how 
centrally important it is to Lawrence that Texas singled out gay men and 
lesbians and sought to control the sexual relationships of this group 
alone.  Contrasting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.149 and Gonzales v. 
Carhart150 with Lawrence will demonstrate this point.151 
 
146. Id. at 1093. 
147. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
laws that regulate sexual behavior reflect “society’s belief that certain forms of sexual 
behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that one could consider certain conduct 
reprehensible—murder, . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even 
‘animus’ toward such conduct.”). 
148. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has 
“effectively decree[d] the end of all morals legislation”). 
149. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
150. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
151. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.  Part III.A draws from my earlier article on this subject.  
See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the 
Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1321, 1325–29 (2004). 
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In Barnes, Indiana defended the application of its public indecency 
law to nude dancers in adults-only strip clubs.152  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion for the Court held that the dancer’s naked 
gyrations were First Amendment expression.153  Over Justice Scalia’s 
vituperative concurrence,154 the plurality required Indiana to justify the 
public indecency statute under intermediate scrutiny.155  The “statute’s 
purpose,” Chief Justice Rehnquist observes, is to “protect[] societal 
order and morality;” statutes like this one plainly “reflect moral 
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public 
places.”156  The plurality concludes without any fuss, that bans on public 
indecency fit well within the “traditional police power of the States . . . 
to provide for the public health, safety, and morals” of their citizens.157  
Consequently, Indiana’s requirement that nude dancers wear pasties in 
strip clubs “furthers a substantial government interest in protecting 
order and morality.”158 
Indiana’s reason for prohibiting public nudity closely resembles 
Texas’s reason for banning same-sex sodomy—to stigmatize nude 
dancers and people who frequent nude clubs as criminals and brand 
their conduct as indecent and immoral.159  Barnes, however, upholds 
Indiana’s restriction, even though the reasoning linking the statute and 
public decency was more opaque than the pasties Indiana law forced 
dancers to wear.160  Lap dances with pasties are not much more decent 
than lap dances without pasties. 
 
152. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (explaining Indiana’s contention that the “restriction on 
nude dancing is a valid ‘time, place, or manner’ restriction”). 
153. See id. at 565–66 (summarizing past decisions and ultimately finding nude dancing 
to be on the “outer perimeters” of First Amendment expression). 
154. Justice Scalia would only have required Indiana to demonstrate that the law had a 
rational basis.  Id. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
155. Id. at 567 (plurality opinion) (holding that Indiana’s public indecency statute 
“furthers substantial governmental interests”); see also id. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
plurality purports to apply . . . an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny . . . .”). 
156. Id. at 568 (plurality opinion).  To be fair, Indiana likely disapproves of people in 
public being nude around their friends, too. 
157. Id. at 569. 
158. Id. 
159. Compare id. at 568, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (explaining 
the traditional moral disapproval influencing laws such as the one at issue in the case). 
160. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571–72 (upholding Indiana law on the basis that it was 
narrowly tailored and was “modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State’s 
purpose”). 
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Though it is true that nude dance clubs are public accommodations, 
it is harder to say that the dancing occurs in public.  Parents do not have 
to worry that, while out in public, their children might accidentally 
glimpse an erotic dancer gyrating in the nude.  (That a child might 
instead glimpse an erotic dancer in pasties is cold comfort indeed.)  The 
only “public” that ever saw nude dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge (the 
Indiana strip club in Barnes) were people who knew what they would 
find when they walked in off the street—and they would only be 
offended by the club’s decency, not its indecency.161  The Court ignored 
these problems.162  Patrons wanted to see what Indiana did not want 
them to see, and the Court let Indiana impose its moral preference that 
the patrons’ preferences be made illegal.163 
How can Indiana’s moral preferences outweigh the free expression 
rights of nude dancers and the liberty interests of their patrons, but 
Texas’s moral preferences do not outweigh the liberty interests of gay 
men and lesbians?  As a legal matter, Barnes would seem to present the 
more compelling constitutional case.164  The Court assumed that the 
dancing was protected expression, so the Indiana law had to satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny.165  Indiana justified the statute solely on grounds 
of morality, and the evidence linking the statute to any improvement in 
South Bend’s moral tone was at best diaphanous.166  Nevertheless, the 
strip club goers and nude dancers lost.  The Court merely asserted 
without reasoning that Indiana’s interest in morality was substantial.167 
 
161. See id. at 563, 566. 
162. See id. at 566, 569 (finding that the public indecency statute “furthers a substantial 
government interest” but failing to address the Respondent’s contention that there is no 
“nonconsenting” public nudity).  
163. Id. at 569. 
164. See id. at 565–66 (finding that exotic dancing is a form of First Amendment 
expression). 
165. Id. at 565–67. 
166. Id. at 569. 
167. Id.  But see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: 
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1270–71 (2004) (arguing that 
Barnes signals the Court’s increasing acceptance of the harm principle because only four 
justices accepted the proposition that morality standing alone could justify limits on 
expression).  In McGowan, supra note 151, at 1327 n.91, I explain that Professor Goldberg’s 
count omits Justice Thomas, who replaced one of Barnes’s dissenters.  Justice Thomas 
dissented in Lawrence because—though “silly”—morality-based statutes are constitutional.  
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605–06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)).  Furthermore, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 158–59 (2007), supports the conclusion that states and the federal government can 
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Similarly, Justice Kennedy—the author of Lawrence and Romer—
authored an opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart168 that upholds 
bare disgust as a valid justification for a federal law that bans one type 
of late-term abortion—dilation and extraction (D&X)—while 
permitting another—dilation and evacuation (D&E)—in which the fetus 
is removed from the uterus piece by piece.169  On its face, Carhart is 
flatly inconsistent with Lawrence and the other rigorous rational basis 
cases.170  Supreme Court precedent prior to Gonzales puts abortions and 
women on different footing than same-sex sodomy and gay men and 
lesbians were on prior to Romer and Lawrence: abortion restrictions 
receive heightened scrutiny and women are a protected class under 
Supreme Court precedent.171 
Nevertheless, Congress’s moral conclusions—that the brutality and 
grisliness of the D&X procedure assaulted the dignity of human life—
was enough to sustain the law.172  The United States offered nothing else 
to support it.  There was no evidence that the D&X ban would preserve 
fetal life by reducing the overall number of abortions performed.173  
Federal law still permits late-term D&E abortions, which are similarly 
gruesome and end fetal life just as conclusively.174  Furthermore, Carhart 
upheld this ban despite plausible objections that the ban on D&X 
abortions imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion,175 
because D&E abortions may be more dangerous for many women.176  
Carhart’s failure to justify why morality trumps the rights of women who 
wish to have the safest type of late-term abortion demonstrates how 
 
still pass laws that satisfy moral preferences standing alone.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 155–163.   
168. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 130. 
169. Id. at 160. 
170. Compare id. at 158–61 (reasoning that moral distaste and a view that a certain 
procedure is “brutal” suffices to establish legitimate government interest), with Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 577–78 (incorporating Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 216 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).  
171. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973). 
172. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, 160; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962 
(2000) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (arguing that Nebraska’s ban on D&X abortions should be 
sustained because Nebraska has the “right to declare a moral difference between” D&X and 
D&E abortion procedures). 
173. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
174. See id. at 182. 
175. Id. at 147 (majority opinion). 
176. See id. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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pressing the need is for guiding principles rather than mere judicial 
intuition to guide this area of equal protection and substantive due 
process doctrine. 
The Court appears to believe that the stigma of same-sex sodomy 
laws is notable because it is directed toward gays and only gays.  
Unfortunately, this objection does not really distinguish same-sex 
sodomy laws from other laws.177  The public indecency statute in Barnes 
surely stigmatized the men who visited totally nude clubs and the 
dancers who performed in the nude for them.178  The public indecency 
statute and the prosecution of the Kitty Kat Lounge reflected the state’s 
moral distaste for the kinds of people who would like to appear nude in 
public and who frequent totally nude clubs; Indiana offered no other 
justification for its statute.179  The federal late-term abortion restrictions 
 
177. This distinction may not be true as a factual matter, either.  People who do not 
identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual sometimes experiment with having sex with partners of 
the same sex.  In a 1992 survey of Americans about sexuality, about 4% of women surveyed 
reported that they had had sex with a woman at some point in their lives, 2% said that they 
had had sex with a woman in the last year, but only 1.4% of women identified themselves as 
lesbian or bisexual.  ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 
174–77 (1994).  The survey also found that about 3% of men had sex with men but did not 
identify as gay.  Id.  A 2009 study found that 8.4% of girls 15–17, 13.8% of girls 18–19, and 
14.2% of women 20–24 responded that they had had a sexual experience with a same-sex 
partner, which is above the generous estimate that about 10% of the population is gay or 
lesbian.  Lorrie Gavin et al., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Sexual and Reproductive 
Health of Persons Aged 10–24 Years—United States, 2002–2007, 58 MORBIDITY AND 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 17, 2009, at 1, 19 tbl.2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5806a1.htm.  Boys and men were less likely to report same-sex 
encounters (3.9% of boys 15–17, 5.1% of boys 18–19, 5.5% of men 20–24), id. at 21 tbl.3, and 
it is likely their lower rate of response was because males and females were asked different 
questions.  Girls and women read the following from a computer screen:  “The next question 
asks about sexual experience you may have had with another female.  Have you ever had any 
sexual experience of any kind with another female?”  Id. at 20 tbl.2 n.¶¶.  Boys and men read: 
The next questions ask about sexual experience you may have had with another 
male.  Have you ever done any of the following with another male?  Put his penis in 
your mouth (oral sex)?  Put your penis in his mouth (oral sex)?  Put his penis in your 
rectum or butt (anal sex)?  Put your penis in his rectum or butt (anal sex)? 
Id. at 22 tbl.3 n.§§; see also Deirdre Dolan, Lesbian Lolitas: High-School Girls Want to Be 
Gay-ish, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 16, 2002, at 1 (explaining a trend among some high school 
girls to experiment sexually with other girls), available at http://www.nyobserver.com/pages/st
ory.asp?ID=6716; Alex Morris, The Cuddle Puddle of Stuyvesant High School, N.Y. MAG. 
(Jan. 28, 2006), http://nymag.com/news/features/15589/ (describing the “social rituals of the 
pansexual, bi-queer, metroflexible New York teen”).   
178. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571–72 (1991). 
179. See id. at 568 (describing the statute’s “clear” purpose as “protecting societal order 
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also stigmatized doctors who performed and women who had late-term 
abortions.180  Testimony before Congress likened D&X abortions to 
infanticide.181 
B. Toward a Workable Distinction Between “Groups” and 
“Classifications” 
Why does morality trump the liberties of nude dancers and strip 
club-goers but not the liberties of gay men and lesbians?  Because the 
Court thinks (and I would agree) that gay men and lesbians as a set are 
a group, while the sets of nude dancers and people who go to strip clubs 
are not a group in the Equal Protection Clause sense.182  It is therefore 
more accurate to say that the Court will strike state statutes that restrict 
the liberties of certain groups, if the state’s reason for the regulation is 
grounded in moral distaste.  The relevant question, then, is what facts 
justify treating a collection of people as a group rather than just as 
individuals who engage in conduct properly subject to plenary 
regulation by the state. 
1. Judges and Cases 
It is best to begin by acknowledging that in many cases it will seem 
obvious that a group exists and that a law limits the rights or liberties of 
that group’s members out of simple spite.  Gay men and lesbians are 
undeniably a social and political group.  They have their own version of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) in the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.183  There 
are gay and lesbian organizations within both the Democratic and 
Republican parties, and lobbyists advocate gay and lesbian rights on 
Capitol Hill and in state legislatures across the nation.184  Every year gay 
 
and morality”); see also id. at 569 (holding that the statute was constitutional on the sole 
grounds that “order and morality” further a “substantial government interest”).  
180. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000). 
181. Id. at 959–60. 
182. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567–72 (revealing the heart of the Court’s analysis); see also 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1996) (explaining that “laws singling out a certain class 
of citizens for disfavored legal status . . . are rare” because such laws are “denial of equal 
protection . . . in the most literal sense”). 
183. See LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).  
 184.  See,  e.g.,  LOG  CABIN  REPUBLICANS,  http://www.logcabin.org/site/c.nsKSL7PML
pF/b.5468093/k.BE4C/Home.htm  (last  visited  Dec.  2,  2012);  NATIONAL  STONEWALL 
DEMOCRATS, http://www.stonewalldemocrats.org/about/who (last visited Dec. 2, 2012);. 
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men and lesbians hold huge “Pride” parades in cities across the United 
States.185  Law students can join gay and lesbian groups at most colleges 
and law schools, and bar associations in many cities have gay and lesbian 
sections, as does the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).  
Sexual orientation also matters to a person’s self-perception.  Indeed, 
that is one reason why gay men and lesbians have created political and 
legal organizations to represent their interests.186  How could it be 
otherwise?  By definition, sexual orientation affects a person’s choice of 
sexual and life partners and whether and how someone will have 
children.187  It affects how others perceive that person, too. 
Persons with disabilities are also an identity group.  Like gay men 
and lesbians, individuals with disabilities have created social, political, 
and legal organizations, and employ lobbyists to represent their interests 
in Congress and in statehouses.  Disability shapes people’s perceptions 
of and experiences in the world.  It can affect a person’s opportunities 
and life plans, depending on the extent to which a person requires and 
receives reasonable accommodations.  Knowing that a person has a 
disability can also alter others’ view of that person.  All of these factors 
can contribute to a person’s self-identity and to the persona projected in 
public. 
 
185. See, e.g., John Leland, Cheering a Gay Marriage Law, and Its Champions, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A15; Tony Perry, Now it’s History: San Diego Gay Pride 
Parade 2012, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012
/07/now-its-history-san-diego-gay-pride-parade-2012.html. 
186. For example, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the Human Rights 
Campaign, and the Log Cabin Republicans exist to represent the interests of the gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual community.  See supra notes 183–84. 
187. Same-sex couples obviously can and do raise families.  The California Supreme 
Court noted that based on the 2000 Census, in California alone, over 70,000 children were 
being raised by same-sex couples.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 n.50 (Cal. 2008), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.  The 2010 American 
Community Survey Data (produced by the U.S. Census Bureau) estimates that 17.5% of 
same-sex couples have children, which is about 104,000 families in total.  See American 
Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, tbl.1 (2010), 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables-2010.xls.  The Williams Institute at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, reports a slightly higher number of same-sex couples 
raising children—about 110,000, which may simply reflect an increase in numbers between 
2010 and 2012.  Press Release, The Williams Institute, As Overall Percentage of Same-Sex 
Couples Raising Children Declines, Those Adopting Almost Doubles – Significant Diversity 
Among  Lesbian  and  Gay  Families  (Jan.  25,  2012),  http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/pr
ess/press-releases/as-overall-percentage-of-same-sex-couples-raising-children-declines-those-
adopting-almost-doubles-significant-diversity-among-lesbian-and-gay-families/ (reporting 
that there are now “more than 110,000” same-sex couples raising children). 
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It is tempting to conclude from these two examples that the Court 
extended constitutional protection to existing “identity groups.”  This 
conclusion proves too much.  People constitute their identities in all 
sorts of ways the Court would not and should not protect.  A purely 
descriptive notion of identity group could suggest that classes of people 
like “Chicago Cubs fans” are an identity group deserving constitutional 
recognition.  Such a result would seem odd, just as it would seem odd for 
a person to insist on choosing her spouse from only the pool of existing 
Cubs fans—partly because she could well persuade her spouse to 
become a Cubs fan, and partly because she might not always be a Cubs 
fan.  Even with regard to sexual identity, a purely descriptive notion of a 
group seems unlikely to predict when the Court would apply rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny.  If it strikes you as unlikely that the Court would 
today declare unconstitutional legislative efforts to discourage the 
practice of the “furry” fetish or the “furry” lifestyle,188 then it cannot be 
that the Court grants protection to some groups from restrictions based 
in animus because they are identity groups.  Subjective “identity” may 
therefore be a necessary condition for a group to constitute itself.  
Standing alone it is not a sufficient condition for constitutional 
protection. 
The First Circuit has said that “historic . . . disadvantage” and 
unpopularity explain the Moreno-to-Lawrence line of cases.189  While 
some of the groups in that line of cases have historically been 
disadvantaged, it does not explain all of these cases.190  Hippies—the 
group that sparked rigorous rational basis scrutiny in Moreno191—were 
too new a group to be historically disadvantaged.  Historic disadvantage 
also does not explain rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s extension to 
illegal aliens in Plyler.192  It is true that undocumented aliens are 
disadvantaged and provoke feelings of prejudice and suspicion in many, 
but their undocumented status causes most of their difficulties.  Lack of 
popularity is too powerful an explanation.  Groups or members of 
 
188. For more on “furries,” see Dan Savage, Savage Love: Furry Friends, THE 
STRANGER  (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/SavageLove?oid=11570. 
189. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (2012).   
190. Id.  
191. See id.;  see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973) (noting 
that the food stamp regulations at issue in the case were “aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie 
communes’”). 
192. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (extending rigorous rational basis to laws 
restricting rights to undocumented aliens).  
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classes who are challenging a law are unpopular enough that a majority 
has been willing to disadvantage them. 
The Court’s decisions also belie its assertion that “animus” towards a 
group or a group’s political unpopularity triggers rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny.193  Indeed, the Court’s decisions have protected groups that—
even if unpopular in many ways—have amassed significant political 
power.194  Gay men and lesbians were more politically vulnerable in the 
years leading up to 1986 than in 1996 or 2003.195  Most states were in the 
process of repealing their anti-sodomy laws in the 1990s, and only 
eighteen still banned it when Lawrence held them to be 
unconstitutional.196  Today gay men and lesbians may marry in nine 
states and the District of Columbia.197  Same-sex couples have the right 
to enter into relationships with the same rights and privileges that attach 
to marriage in several other states.198  In some states, courts granted 
same-sex partners the right to marry,199 but in others, the right to marry 
has been extended by state legislatures200 or by state initiatives.201 
Furthermore, several states prohibited sexual orientation 
 
193. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that Colorado constitutional 
amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
 194.  See supra note 184.  
195. See id. 
196. Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy that Led to the Lawrence 
Decision, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 26, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-right_hiv-
aids/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision; Carlos Maza, State 
Sodomy Laws Continue to Target LGBT Americans, EQUALITY MATTERS BLOG (Apr. 08, 
2011, 3:26 PM), http://equality matters.org/blog/201108080012. 
197. Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2012) (showing a state-by-state 
breakdown of marriage laws in the United States). 
198. Id. 
199. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding 
that restrictions on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862 (Iowa 2009) (same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–61, 968 
(Mass. 2003). 
200. See D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 
2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 10-a (Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (2012).  
201. In November 2012, Maine, Maryland, and Washington voters passed initiatives 
granting same-sex couples the right to marry.  Same Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnership 
on the Ballot, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2012),   http://www.ncsl.org/legislatur
es-elections/elections/same-sex-marriage-on-the-ballot.aspx?stateid=wa#data. 
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discrimination in 2003, and several more have since.202  Persons with 
disabilities were more vulnerable in the 1930s when Justice Holmes 
wrote his infamous opinion in Buck v. Bell than they were in 1985 when 
the Court decided Cleburne.203  Cleburne followed the Rehabilitation 
Act and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act by about a 
decade and preceded the Americans with Disabilities Act by five 
years.204  And just four years after Plyler, Congress granted many illegal 
aliens amnesty through the Immigration Reform and Control Act.205 
At the same time, the Court has expressly refused to apply 
heightened scrutiny to laws that disadvantage two of the groups with the 
least political clout—felons206 and poor people.207  Several states, in fact, 
render even non-violent felons politically powerless by denying them 
the right to vote after their prison sentences have been completed.208  
 
202. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map, ACLU (Sep. 21, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map. 
203. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
204. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (1985); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)); 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2006)); Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
205. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 
3394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)). 
206. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974) (holding that statutory 
exclusion of felons from standard voting rights does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause despite argument that it doesn’t further legitimate state interest).  
207. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (declining 
to find that poverty was a suspect class).  An illustration from tax policy shows how difficult it 
is to move congress to address issues affecting the poor.  In 2003, as part of a general tax cut, 
Congress increased the tax credit for children for most middle-class families but failed to 
extend that tax credit to poor families who were eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit.  
See David Firestone, DeLay Rebuffs Move to Restore Lost Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2003, at A1 [hereinafter Fireston, Delay].  This failure appeared to have been an error, as 
President George W. Bush said that he would have supported extending the credit increase to 
working poor families.  See David Firestone, Bush Presses House Republicans on Credits for 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at A26 [hereinafter Firestone, Bush Presses] (reporting that 
“[t]he White House all but demanded today that House Republicans quickly approve a 
Senate bill to increase the child tax credit for 6.5 million low-income families” but the 
President’s demands “did not immediately persuade House leaders to” do so).  Nevertheless, 
even with the President’s support, it took several months for Congress to fix this problem.  
See Firestone, Bush Presses, supra; Firestone, Delay, supra.   
208. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; Michael McLaughlin, Felon Voting Laws 
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Many others suspend felons’ rights for several years or require felons to 
petition to have their rights restored.209  Recall as well that the Lawrence 
Court said explicitly that the logic of Lawrence would not extend to 
granting rights to such politically unpopular groups as prostitutes, 
polygamists, or practitioners of adult incest.210 
Maybe, when the Court says “politically unpopular,” it means that 
the group is a minority and that animus toward the group motivated the 
legislation.211  Animus, the Court has emphasized, is not a sufficient or 
rational basis for imposing greater burdens on a group or denying 
liberties to its members.212  The problem with this spin on the Court’s 
meaning is that it makes the heightened rational basis standard 
dizzyingly circular: Groups merit heightened rational basis if they have 
been treated malevolently by law or government actors, but it is only 
heightened scrutiny, rather than the hypothetical justifications that 
suffice for ordinary rational basis scrutiny, that will uncover malevolent 
purposes concealed behind the assertion of neutral ones. 
Nor is “animus” shorthand for Carolene Products’ “discrete and 
insular minorities.”213  A group is “discrete” and “insular” if it is unable 
to bridge its gap with other members of society to form effective 
political alliances that might better its members’ position.214  Some of the 
 
Disenfranchise 5.85 Million Americans with Criminal Records: The Sentencing Project, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/12/felon-voting-
laws-disenfranchise-sentencing-project_n_1665860.html. 
209. See supra note 208. 
210. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present case does not involve 
minors[,] . . . persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused[,] . . . public conduct or prostitution[, or] . . . 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”). 
211. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that Colorado 
constitutional amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it 
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”); 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . . burdens personal relationships and 
exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and such “statutes have consistently 
failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)).   
212. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (holding that Colorado constitutional amendment’s 
“sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
213. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
214. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the law at issue works to 
isolate and deny “a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers 
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Court’s rigorous rational basis decisions can surely be explained as 
attempts to protect “discrete and insular minorities.”  Plyler v. Doe, 
which struck down Texas’s decision to bar illegal immigrant children 
from public schools, makes perfect sense as a case of protecting discrete 
and insular minorities from harm at the hands of the majority.215  If, as 
the late John Hart Ely argued, Justice Stone’s reference to discrete and 
insular minorities referred to “the sort of ‘pluralist’ wheeling and 
dealing by which the various minorities that make up our society 
typically interact to protect their interests,”216 there is probably no more 
discrete and insular minority than illegal immigrant children.  By 
definition, they cannot protect—or even voice—their interests in the 
political process and are at the complete mercy of those with political 
power. 
As an explanation for other cases, however, discreteness and 
insularity simply replicates many of the same problems that there were 
with using political unpopularity as the criterion triggering group status 
and rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  Gay men and lesbians probably 
were a discrete and insular group when Professor Ely argued in 
Democracy and Distrust that the Court should hold that gay men and 
lesbians are a suspect class.217  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many (if 
not most) gay men and lesbians lived closeted lives and only expressed 
their sexual identities when they were safe in gay and lesbian 
neighborhoods and bars.218  Of course, that was when the Court handed 
down Bowers, not Lawrence.219  Today, it is harder to make the case that 
gay men and lesbians are a discrete and insular minority.  Gay men and 
lesbian women came out in large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s.220  
In doing so, gay men and lesbians engaged their communities, and the 
 
to other children” because they come from undocumented immigrant families). 
215. Id. 
216. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
151 (1980). 
217. Id. at 163. 
218. Richard Socarides, Is The Battle For Gay Rights Over?, NEW YORKER (June 22, 
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/is-the-battle-for-gay-rights-
over.html.  
219. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (noting the dates of the decisions). 
220. Michael Levy, Gay Rights Movement, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/766382/gay-rights-movement (last visited Dec. 2, 
2012). 
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political processes of those communities, as group members rather than 
simply as individual members of the broader community.  That 
engagement, I argue below, is an important part of the justification for 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny. 
Persons with disabilities also illustrate the problems with using the 
discrete and insular concept to define group status.  In some respects, 
persons with disabilities are discrete and insular.  The majority of 
persons with serious disabilities do not have jobs,221 which cuts them off 
from the regular social contact that comes with work.  From this 
perspective, persons with disabilities seem “discrete and insular.”222  
From the perspective of the ability of persons with disabilities to protect 
their rights and interests, however, they have political clout.223  Members 
of the disabilities rights community worked closely with Congress in 
drafting, revising, and shepherding the Americans with Disabilities Act 
through Congress in 1990 and in passing amendments in 2008 to 
strengthen its protections.224  In Congress’s deliberations over the 
original ADA, many members of Congress spoke of the possibility that 
anyone could become a person with a disability because of mishap and 
 
221. In 2012, a little over 20% of persons with disabilities were in the labor force, 
compared with about 70% of persons without disabilities.  See U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Economic News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, tbl.A-6, http://www.bls.gov/news.r
elease/empsit.t06.htm (last modified Oct. 5, 2012).  Among those in the labor force, about 
13% of persons with disabilities were unemployed, compared with about 8% those without 
disabilities.  Id.  In 2000, the Census reported that about half of persons with a sensory 
disability were employed, only a third of persons with a physical disability were, as were 
about 30% of persons with mental disabilities.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, DISABILITY STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION 
BY SEX AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO 
tbl.2 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t32/tables
/tab02-US.pdf. 
222. One of the most striking things about the passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act was that many members of Congress and members of the executive branch 
felt personally invested in the cause of civil rights for persons with disabilities.  Many of the 
ADA’s congressional supporters either had disabilities themselves or had family members 
who had disabilities.  See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 33 (2000).  Every member of congress had colleagues who 
had disabilities.  Id.  Just to name a few—Bob Dole, then Senate Minority Leader, had lost 
use of his arm in World War II and Senator Daniel Inouye had lost his arm in the same war.  
Id.  Tony Coelho, the bill’s original House sponsor, had epilepsy.  Id.  Richard Thornburgh, 
then Attorney General, had a child with mental disabilities, and President George H.W. Bush 
had a son with learning disabilities and an uncle who was a quadriplegic.  Id. 
223. Id. 
224. See id. 
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the likelihood that they would each become disabled with age.225  A 
group of persons that others risk (and know they risk) joining is far less 
discrete and far less insular than Blacks or gay men and lesbians. 
Even worse, the Court often refuses to protect other groups that are 
discrete and insular.226  Bill Eskridge and the late Phil Frickey have 
argued that the Court’s actual practice stands Carolene Products on its 
head.227  Constitutional protection follows after a group has already 
amassed some political clout.  “So long as a group really is politically 
marginalized,” however, “the Court will tolerate virtually any action by 
Congress or the states that adversely affects the minority.”228  The 
foregoing analysis certainly supports their conclusion.  Their conclusion, 
however, strips the Court of its leading normative justification for its 
authority to negative legislation—John Hart Ely’s elaboration of Chief 
Justice Stone’s footnote in Carolene Products—and leaves the Court 
with something that looks more like might makes right.229 
 
225. Id. at 34. 
226. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the statutory 
provision does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, 
therefore, people with a felony record are not a suspect class); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
137, 141 (1971) (holding that poverty is not a suspect class). 
227. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 54–55 (observing that “the Court's equal 
protection jurisprudence has shown an ‘inverted Carolene’ quality”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2371–72 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Effects] 
(describing how “constitutional protection” is “primarily a function of the political progress a 
minority group has made,” and if “socially despised and not politically organized, [the 
minority group] will be subject to pervasive state segregation into inferior spheres of the 
culture”). 
228. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 54.  Eskridge and Frickey give Board of 
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), as an 
example.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 55.  That case involved members of the 
Satmara sect of Judaism, who lived together in isolated religious communities and educated 
their children in private, religious schools.  Id.  Frickey and Eskridge characterize the Satmara 
as “the classic ‘discrete and insular minority.’”  Id.  The Satmara who lived in the Village of 
Kiryas Joel could not provide adequate educational services to children with learning 
disabilities.  Id.  New York passed a special statute making Kiryas Joel its own school district 
so that Satmar children with learning disabilities could receive special education services.  Id.  
The Supreme Court, however, struck the New York statute as amounting to an establishment 
of religion in violation of the First Amendment.  Id.; see also Eskridge, Effects, supra note 
227, at 2372 (explaining that if a group is “completely powerless, the Supreme Court will not 
protect it against suppression,” but may protect “individual victims under the libertarian 
provisions of the Constitution”). 
229. See ELY, supra note 216, at 151 (explaining that the group we should be protecting 
are those that legislatures won’t necessarily have incentive to protect.); Eskridge, Effects, 
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2.  Legal Scholars’ Attempts to Describe “Groups” Fall Short 
Scholars have offered various answers to this question, none of them 
wholly satisfactory.  In a famous article directed at equal protection (not 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny), Owen Fiss advocated a group-based 
approach to equal protection.230  Although his argument was not 
directed at the cases I analyze here, it is the clearest and best defense of 
the proposition that the concept of a group is legally cogent and useful, 
if not strictly necessary. 
Fiss distinguished between groups and classifications, or, in his 
terminology, between “artificial classes”—“those created by a 
classification or criterion embodied in a state practice or statute”—and 
social groups, which had an independent social identity.231  A “social 
group” was “more than a collection of individuals, all of whom . . . 
happen to arrive at the same street corner at the same moment.”232  A 
social group is “an entity” that “has a distinct existence apart from its 
members” and “an identity.”233  In other words, Fiss said, other people 
understand what you are talking about when you “talk about the 
group,” and you can do so “without reference to the particular 
individuals” who are its members.234 
Fiss’s social-recognition approach introduces an element of 
subjectivity to deciding whether a collection of persons is a group, and 
some scholars find that subjectivity fatal to any group-based approach to 
constitutional law.235  Larry Alexander, for example, has argued that it is 
a fool’s errand to base equal protection on the concept of social groups 
because the concept is impossible to define and apply with any 
precision.236  Defining the paradigmatic social group of “Blacks” is 
 
supra note 227, at 2371–72 (describing how “constitutional protection” is “primarily a 
function of the political progress a minority group has made,” and if “socially despised and 
not politically organized, [the minority group] will be subject to pervasive state segregation 
into inferior spheres of the culture”). 
230. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 107, 
108 (1976).  
231. Id. at 156. 
232. Id. at 148. 
233. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
234. Id.  
235. See id. at 148 (describing a social group as an entity with a “distinct existence apart 
from its members” and that people subjectively “know” and recognize it’s a group). 
236. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the Irrelevance of 
“Groups,” 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 1, art. 1, Aug. 2002, at 1, 6, available at 
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impossible, he argues.237  Race cannot be determined biologically or 
genetically.  Appearance does not work either—some people who look 
white consider themselves Black.  One might also ask whether recent 
immigrants from Africa or the Caribbean are “Black.”  What race are 
children born to Asian American and Black parents?  Any answer to 
these questions provokes disagreement. 
Others have argued that extending constitutional protection to 
groups as opposed to prohibiting certain general classifications is that 
group protection will promote group separatism as opposed to 
assimilation into the larger American culture.238  The argument goes that 
separatism, in turn, will kindle identity politics, with different groups 
competing for their share of political goodies rather than being 
interested in policies that promote the broader good. 
Notwithstanding the presence of borderline cases, the element of 
subjectivity they entail, and the danger of group protection kindling 
separatism, Fiss’s work has been influential.  His influence can be seen 
in the work of later scholars who have attempted to explain and justify 
the rigorous rational basis cases without defining or defending a concept 
of groups.  For example, Cass Sunstein has argued that in the laws 
challenged in these cases the government singled out certain classes of 
people—gay men and lesbians, persons with mental disabilities, and 
(perhaps) hippies—because of their status.239  Particularly in Cleburne 
and Romer, Sunstein argues: 
[W]e can find a desire to isolate and seal off members of a 
despised group whose characteristics are thought to be in some 
sense contaminating or corrosive.  In its most virulent forms, this 
desire is rooted in a belief that members of the relevant group 
are not fully human.240 
But Sunstein does not explore how to distinguish discrimination 
 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art1. 
237. See id. 
238. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 82 (2000) [hereinafter 
YOUNG, INCLUSION] (discussing how some object to group representation because “group-
specific political movements endanger democracy and make meaningful communication 
impossible” by “divid[ing] and destroy[ing] public discussion, creating bickering and self-
interested enclaves with no orientation towards transformative deliberation or co-
operation”). 
239. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 62. 
240. Id. at 62–63. 
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based on status from discrimination based on conduct.241  How does the 
Court know whether a law aims at people because of what they do 
rather than because they are the type of person who would do such 
things?  He therefore does not resolve the question whether bans on 
same-sex sodomy and general bans on sodomy, struck down by 
Lawrence under rigorous rational basis scrutiny, are impermissible bans 
on status or merely bans on conduct.242 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have also argued that Romer, 
Cleburne, and Plyler243 (and perhaps Moreno)244 might be best explained 
by what they call the “pariah principle.”245  This principle forbids the 
government from “brand[ing]” a group “as inferior and encourag[ing] 
others to ostracize them.”246  Colorado’s Amendment 2, at issue in 
Romer v. Evans, provides their main example.247  Under that 
Amendment, gay men and lesbians, unlike any other group of persons in 
Colorado, were “permanently disbarred from seeking . . . protection” 
against discrimination based on their sexual orientation.248  Farber and 
Sherry also read the Court’s prohibition on laws motivated by “a bare 
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” as prohibiting 
government from enacting laws that solely or primarily embody the 
purpose “to brand [a group] as outcasts,”249 which Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 did.  In short, the Constitution prohibits the state from 
passing laws that create legal castes. 
Farber and Sherry do not just assert the distinction between status 
and conduct.250  They explain that Amendment 2 targeted status because 
it applied to gay men and lesbians regardless whether any particular 
individual was or ever had been sexually active.251  Similarly, the children 
in Plyler were barred from school because of their status: they were not 
 
241. See generally id. 
242. Id. 
243. Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at 280, 284. 
244. See id. at 276.  Farber and Sherry quote from Moreno when describing the pariah 
principle, but they do not argue that the food-stamp restriction reflects a desire to brand 
hippies as pariahs.  Id. 
245. Id. at 284. 
246. Id. at 267. 
247. See id. at 270–71. 
248. Id. at 278–79. 
249. Id. at 276 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
250. See id. at 279. 
251. Id. 
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responsible for their status as illegal aliens, their parents were.252  And 
though the City of Cleburne couched some of its arguments for 
restricting the group home in terms of conduct (persons with mental 
disabilities might have trouble evacuating the home in case of a flood), 
others sounded in status (neighboring middle-schoolers might harass 
residents because of their disabilities and property values would decline 
in and around the group home).253 
Though the distinctions they draw in these cases appear sound, the 
status–conduct distinction cannot provide a principle to justify the 
rigorous rational basis cases.  First, Lawrence protects conduct, full 
stop.254  A person need not identify as gay or lesbian to have his or her 
right to engage in same-sex sodomy protected.255  Farber and Sherry do 
not discuss sodomy prohibitions, and this reason may be why. 
Second, the status–conduct distinction is too slippery to be useful.  
One may become addicted to drugs through conduct but addiction itself 
would seem to be a status, one that compels you to take drugs.  One 
takes drugs and one is addicted, but divorcing the two is hard and may 
not be useful for many purposes.  Like the speech–conduct distinction 
that cannot explain free speech doctrine, the status–conduct distinction 
cannot be the basis for a workable constitutional principle.  Most 
troublingly, one’s moral view of a group and its conduct strongly 
influences the classification.  Even if a clear line could be drawn, the 
status–conduct distinction is a pallid principle for rigorous rational basis 
cases.  For gay men and lesbians, the status–conduct distinction 
withholds their “right to engage” in conduct that “express[es] . . . love 
and thus . . . their sense of self.”256 
Apart from the status–conduct distinction, the pariah principle does 
not explain the rigorous rational basis cases.  Farber and Sherry candidly 
admit that the pariah principle does not fully protect the rights of gay 
men and lesbians.257  That principle would allow states to ban same-sex 
 
252. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
253. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985). 
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (incorporating into its holding 
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986), overruled by 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
255. Id. at 578. 
256. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 210, 253 (1989) [hereinafter KARST, BELONGING].   
257. Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at 280–81.  
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marriage,258 restrict gay men and lesbians’ receipt of top secret security 
clearances, and generally restrict their service in the military under 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”259  Lower courts have held, however, that 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s prohibition against laws based solely on 
moral objections to gay men and lesbians cuts the other way.260 
More recently, Kenneth Karst has argued that the Court’s concern 
about the subordination of minority groups animates most if not all of 
the substantive due process cases.261  Meyer v. Nebraska protected the 
rights of German immigrants to pass on the German language to their 
children.262  Pierce v. Society of Sisters protected the rights of Catholics, a 
religious minority in Oregon, to educate their children consistent with 
their religious beliefs.263  Loving v. Virginia recognized the fundamental 
right to marriage to dismantle an essential legal pillar of racial 
apartheid.264  Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe recognized the right to 
contraception and abortion, providing women with the control over 
their reproduction that is necessary to their equal citizenship.265  
Lawrence recognized the right of gay men and lesbians to have sex in 
order to secure their equal right to pursue intimate relationships with 
others.266 
Professor Karst’s essential insight is undeniable—that majorities 
often restrict the liberties of minority groups in order to preserve the 
 
258. Id. at 281–82. 
259. Id. 
260. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (invalidating federal Defense of Marriage Act using rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2012) (invalidating a California 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage using rigorous rational basis scrutiny), 
cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 
2012); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating 
Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage using rigorous rational basis scrutiny).  
261. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process 
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007).   
262. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396, 403 (1923). 
263. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532, 534–35 (1925). 
264. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
265. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  Connecticut’s law permitted men 
but not women to use birth control—it expressly permitted the use of condoms to prevent 
disease.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).   
266. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  
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power and dominant social position of majority group members.267  That 
insight rings true in the context of the rigorous rational basis scrutiny, as 
well.  The Court has said in each of the rigorous rational basis cases that 
it is protecting a minority group from being singled out for ill 
treatment.268  Groups matter to the Supreme Court.  They have mattered 
in the past, and they will matter in the future.  But this explanation for 
rigorous rational basis does not explain how to identify a group for 
purposes of constitutional protection.  It therefore leaves unanswered an 
essential step in this analysis. 
Using the examples of Blacks, women, gay men, lesbians, and 
persons with disabilities, Professor William Eskridge has described how 
identity-based social movements have persuaded the Supreme Court 
that the traits they possess are tolerable or benign variations from the 
norm.269  The Court thus forbids majorities from using the traits to justify 
laws that stigmatize those who possess it or laws that limit the civil rights 
of such persons.270  Professor Eskridge, however, does not explain why 
identity groups deserve more protection from state regulation of 
morality than individuals whose identities are constituted by legally 
forbidden conduct.271 
The shortfalls in these theories suggest that to understand rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny, we must understand what groups are from the 
perspective of that doctrine. 
It is tempting to argue that “groups” share immutable characteristics 
while members of disadvantaged classes do not, but some features that 
intuitively seem to define groups are mutable—people change religious 
affiliations and learn new languages, after all—and some features of 
classes would be hard to change.  For example, a liquor store owner 
whose business will go under because of restrictions on Sunday sales 
may have no easy way to shift to a new line of work. 
The distinction between status and conduct also presents a 
superficially appealing but ultimately inadequate justification for 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  For example, the Lawrence and Bowers 
Courts’ divergent characterization of the same facts drove their 
 
267. See KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 1–2. 
268. See generally supra Part II. 
269. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 467–68 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling].   
270. See id. at 438.  
271. See generally id. 
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conclusions about whether those facts presented cognizable claims 
under the Constitution.272  Under the Bowers Court’s view that sodomy 
was a deviant act, Georgia’s decision to ban sodomy was similar to its 
decision to ban the use of marijuana at home.273  Moral objections are a 
perfectly sensible reason for such bans, as criminal laws often reflect 
society’s moral disapproval of the proscribed acts more than they reflect 
concerns about the harm to third parties.  Under the Lawrence Court’s 
view that gay men and lesbians had similar moral worth as 
heterosexuals, to characterize the right at stake as the act of 
“homosexual” sodomy insults and degrades gay men and lesbians.274  
Sexuality—for all of us—“can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring.”275  In this light, Texas’s law against same-sex 
sodomy looks more like a desire to stigmatize gay men and lesbians as 
deviant outsiders, akin to Cleburne’s requirement of a special use permit 
for group homes for persons with mental disabilities and Plyler’s 
restrictions on illegal immigrant children’s public school attendance.276  
In these cases, the Court held that the state restricted a group’s rights or 
liberties because it disliked that group.  Dislike does not sound rational.  
It sounds mean. 
This conclusion has some intuitive appeal, and it undergirds all of 
the rigorous rational basis cases: hatred of a group of people hardly 
qualifies as a “rational” reason, and laws that target groups seem more 
suspicious than laws that target conduct because that conduct is deemed 
objectionable.277  If correct, then fashioning a principle for these cases 
could be as simple as distinguishing between laws that target groups or 
status and laws that merely target conduct. 
As noted above, however, distinguishing regulations based on status 
 
272. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 190, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
273. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–94 (explaining that there is no “fundamental right” to 
engage in “acts of consensual sodomy” because a ban on such acts is “deeply rooted” in 
national history), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
274. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67. 
275. Id. at 567. 
276. Compare id. at 575, with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 450 (1985) (describing the special permit requirement as an “irrational prejudice against 
the mentally retarded”), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the law at 
issue works to isolate and deny “a discrete group of innocent children the free public 
education that it offers to other children”). 
277. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (describing the law being overturned as an “irrational 
prejudice” and therefore unconstitutional). 
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from those aimed at conduct is much harder than it sounds.  Cass 
Sunstein, for example, argued that Cleburne and Romer (and to a lesser 
extent Moreno)278 
reflect sharp “we-they” distinctions and irrational hatred and 
fear, directed at who they are as much as what they do. . . .  It 
would be hard to imagine a similar measure directed against 
polygamists, adulterers, or fornicators.  Polygamists, adulter[er]s, 
and fornicators are punished through law or norms because of 
what they do.279 
But both polygamists and fornicators have been punished both for 
what they do and who they are.  During the nineteenth century, 
Mormon polygamists were vilified both for what they did (engage in 
plural marriage) and for who they were—Mormons.  Polygamy was 
associated with heathen cultures—“almost exclusively” with “Asiatic 
and . . . African people,” as the Court put it in Reynolds v. United 
States.280  Western civilization had always considered it “odious.”281  Even 
after the Mormon Church reversed its position on polygamy and 
forbade it, Mormons have long continued to be regarded with 
suspicion.282  Furthermore, both fornication and polygamy depend on a 
person’s marital status.  Only unmarried people can commit fornication, 
and only married people can be polygamous.  Both who a person is—
status—and what a person does—conduct—underlie these crimes.283 
 
278. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 62. 
279. Id. (emphasis added). 
280. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
281. Id. 
282. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Divided by God, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2012, at SR1 
(observing that “the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, is the ultimate outsider 
church, persecuted at its inception and regarded with suspicion even now” and “Christian 
theologians” even “wrangle over whether Mormon beliefs should be described as 
Christianity”); Laurie Goodstein, Mormons’ Ad Campaign May Play Out on the ’12 
Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at A1 (reporting that an advertising agency hired 
by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints discovered through “focus groups and 
surveys . . . that Americans who had any opinion at all used adjectives that were downright 
negative: ‘secretive,’ ‘cultish,’ ‘sexist,’ ‘controlling,’ ’pushy,’ ‘anti-gay’”); see also J. Spencer 
Fluhman, Op-Ed., Why We Fear Mormons, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at A25 (observing that 
“[m]ockery of Mormonism comes easily for many Americans” and “many rank-and-file 
evangelical Protestants call Mormonism a cult”). 
283. The distinction between status and conduct is famously elusive, and I wonder 
whether it is worth the candle.  Judge Richard Posner argues forcefully that discrimination 
against gay people boils down to status: 
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This objection to Sunstein’s distinction (and to the status–conduct 
distinction generally) is more generalizable.  It can be difficult to 
distinguish laws that are motivated by animus toward a group from laws 
that are motivated by disapproval of some conduct.  All criminal laws 
stigmatize the prohibited conduct and, by extension, stigmatize the class 
of people who do the prohibited act.284  That is Justice Scalia’s objection 
to Romer: “I had thought that one could consider certain conduct 
reprehensible . . . and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such 
 
[I]f you (being male) say that you'd like to have sex with that nice-looking young 
man but of course will not because you are law-abiding, afraid of AIDS, or 
whatever, you will stand condemned in the minds of many as a disgusting faggot.  
Homosexual acts are punished in an effort, however futile, to destroy the 
inclination. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 233 (1992).  While Judge Posner must be correct 
that many who claim to hate the sin but love the sinner are hypocrites, his argument requires 
that all who so claim are.  As a general matter, I am leery of arguments that are based on the 
proposition of hypocrisy. 
 Janet Halley has argued persuasively that the distinction between status and conduct 
simply collapsed under the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy when the military 
drummed many gay people out of the service based on evidence of non-sexual acts that only 
subtly suggested a person’s sexual orientation.  She says that supporters of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” said it was “supposedly fairer” than the military’s outright ban on gay men and lesbians 
“because it sanctions servicemembers not for ‘who they are’ but for ‘what they do.’”  JANET 
E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY 1 (1999).  
Professor Halley says that spin was, “Wrong, wrong, and wrong again.”  Id.  “Every moving 
part of the new policy is designed to look like conduct regulation in order to hide the fact that 
it turns decisively on status.”  Id. at 2.  Consequently, status protections for gay men and 
lesbians without protections for same-sex sexual conduct provide no real protection from 
sexual orientation discrimination. 
 The gay rights movement also has more ambitious aims: to eradicate the entire spectrum 
of discrimination against gay men and lesbians and for gay men and lesbians to achieve equal 
legal and social status for themselves and their intimate relationships.  Bill Eskridge argues 
that for gays and lesbians to become full-fledged members of our pluralistic democracy, they 
will have to persuade other Americans that their same-sex sexual orientation is merely a 
“benign variation from the [heterosexual] norm.”  Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 
467.  At this point in history, however, many Americans have accepted at most that gay 
people are a “tolerable” variation from the norm.  “Gay people ought not be imprisoned but 
neither should the state promote homosexuality.”  Id. at 468. 
284. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws 
that regulate sexual behavior reflect society’s belief “that certain forms of sexual behavior are 
‘immoral and unacceptable’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), 
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)).  Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that one could consider certain conduct 
reprehensible—murder, . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even 
‘animus’ toward such conduct.”). 
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conduct.”285 
Justice Scalia’s premise is correct (though his illustrations are 
invalid)286—the point of moral objections is to stigmatize the persons 
who engage in such conduct.  The Court has had little problem finding 
some other laws constitutional though nothing but morality justifies 
them.  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. is one such example. 287  Indiana 
offered no justification for its ban on nude dancing besides its moral 
distaste for the dancers who would like to appear nude in front of other 
people and the patrons who frequent totally nude clubs.288  The point of 
the public indecency statute was to discourage nude dancing by 
stigmatizing as criminals nude exotic dancers and the individuals who 
like to watch them.289  Polygamy laws are also grounded solely in moral 
concerns—the belief that marriage between just two people is a better 
form of relationship than plural marriage.  Such laws stigmatize both 
polygamy and polygamists.  Similarly, laws that ban the sale of sex toys 
demean or stigmatize the people who want to use them and the people 
who want to sell them.290 
“Animus” alone cannot be the variable that triggers rational basis 
scrutiny.  Animus toward a group triggers it.  Unfortunately, this 
conclusion does not solve the puzzle of rigorous rational basis scrutiny.  
Any class of people can also be referred to as a group—for example, 
“the group of nude dancers,” “polygamists,” “the group of married 
couples,” “ex-cons.”  That the Court might strike down bans on public 
nudity or distinctions between married and unmarried couples in the tax 
code is pure fantasy.  Moral disapproval of only some groups, therefore, 
must be the trigger for heightened rational basis scrutiny.  The Court, 
 
285. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
286. Justice Scalia unnecessarily undermines his own argument by providing an inapt 
illustration that conflates acts that are prohibited for both moral reasons and their tangible 
harms to third parties’ persons or property (murder and animal cruelty are two of his 
examples) with acts that are prohibited solely for moral reasons (e.g., consensual same-sex 
sodomy).  Id. 
287. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (holding Indiana’s public 
indecency statute constitutional on the grounds that protecting morality is a “substantial 
government interest”). 
288. Id. at 567–68. 
289. Id. at 571–72 
290. Cf. Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to uphold the ban on the sale of sex toys 
because, like Texas’s ban on sodomy, this ban stigmatizes and demeans the intimate conduct 
of persons who use sex toys). 
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however, has never provided criteria for determining which groups 
merit this more rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny and which do 
not. 
In short, the Court’s rational basis scrutiny doctrine has granted 
some groups some discrete rights.  But it has denied them the reasons 
for those rights that could protect them from future attempts to limit 
other rights or privileges.291  It has also denied to other minorities the 
legal arguments necessary to persuade courts to shield them from 
restrictions on their rights. 
IV. THE COURT OUGHT TO PROTECT GROUPS WITH RIGOROUS 
RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY. 
For all the problems defining groups, one thing should be clear: It is 
possible to define “groups” for some purposes.  Even though 
classification cannot be done with perfect objectivity, it does not follow 
that classification is either impossible—it is done all the time—or 
pointless.  “[G]roups are real,”292 even if it is hard to define them 
precisely. 
A. What Is a Group?  The Concept of Structural Groups 
To begin with, the concept of “group” is not utterly vacuous.  Some 
things about groups are clear.  A group is more than the aggregation of 
several individuals.  Groups (and their members) are created and act in 
relation to many different internal and external forces.  These internal 
and external forces can include group members themselves, people 
outside the group, other groups, the law, and social norms (both the 
group’s and outsiders’).  Furthermore, the groups to which we belong 
(and are perceived to belong) often affect our lives and opportunities, in 
part because other people make implicit and explicit assumptions about 
groups and their members.  Sometimes, as well, the groups to which an 
individual belongs (or is perceived to belong) shape and condition her 
social and legal interactions and relationships with other people. 
Even at this general level it is possible to draw distinctions among 
 
291. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1178 (1989) (explaining that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence suffers from a lack of 
specifically enunciated rules, and therefore, does not provide much guidance in the way of 
what does and does not constitute violation).  
292. Iris Marion Young, Status Inequality and Social Groups, 2 ISSUES LEGAL 
Scholarship, no. 1, art. 9, Aug. 2002, at 1, 5, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art9. 
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groups that help determine when treating a collection of people as a 
group is likely to advance certain constitutional goals.  In some groups, 
patterns of interactions restrain the relative freedom and depress the 
material well-being of individual members.  Iris Marion Young calls 
these “structural groups” (after the concept of “structural inequality”).293  
More precisely, she defines such groups as “a collection of persons who 
are similarly positioned in interactive and institutional relations that 
condition their opportunities and life prospects” in mutually reinforcing 
ways.294  Interactions in one context “reinforce the rules and resources 
available for other actions and interactions involving” other members of 
the group.295  Consequently, groups that start with superior social status 
and resources have an easier time staying on top, and groups with 
inferior status have a harder time moving up the social hierarchy.296  That 
is not so with Cubs fans.297 
Structural groups should not be confused with cultural groups, such 
as ethnic or racial groups.  Sometimes these groups overlap, but often 
they do not.  For example, Irish-Americans are a cultural group, as Saint 
Patrick’s Day parades, corned beef and cabbage, and maudlin renditions 
of Danny Boy attest.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
discrimination against Irish-Americans may have also made the group a 
structural group, but no longer.298  Cultural groups emerge when both 
group members and outsiders perceive the group as meaningfully 
distinct from society in general.  This shared feeling of distinctiveness 
arises from interactions between people who speak different languages 
and have different practices and beliefs.  These encounters intensify the 
importance of shared attributes and solidify feelings of “mutual affinity 
and self-consciousness of themselves as groups.”299 
 
293. Id. at 3 (explaining that “[s]tatus inequality” is inherent in a “structural situation 
where a group of individuals” occupies a disadvantaged position). 
294. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 97. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. See supra Part III.B.1. 
298. See YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 81–120 (explaining at length that 
structural groups tend to be those with an inherent “status inequality”). 
299. Id. at 91.  Young provides the example of how the indigenous people of New 
Zealand came to think of themselves as Maori.  Id. at 90.  Before the British arrived, these 
people “saw themselves as belonging to dozens or hundreds” of distinct groups.  Id.  Over 
time, their encounters with the English people, who were quite different from them and who 
viewed and treated them as similar to each other, “changed their perceptions of their 
differences.”  Id.  The Maori were all more different from the English than they were from 
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In contrast women, gay men and lesbians, and racial groups (as 
distinguished from some ethnic or cultural groups) are structural groups 
but not cultural groups.300  These groups are bound together by their 
shared “attempt[] to politicize and protest structural inequalities that 
they perceive unfairly . . . oppress” them.301  Through this process, such 
groups may certainly develop shared practices and identity, but the 
shared experience of protest forged these feelings of affinity and created 
shared practices, not the other way around.302 
People may belong to a structural group whether or not they self-
identify with it and its members.  The existence of these groups is one of 
many of the necessary “conditions under which we form our 
identities . . . .  We act in situation, in relation to the meanings, practices, 
and structural conditions and their interaction into which we are 
thrown.”303  Kwame Anthony Appiah has said, “We make up selves 
from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society.  We 
do make choices, but we do not determine the options among which we 
choose.”304 
Law frequently plays a central role in creating and sustaining 
structural groups.  It can make some groups legally superior or legally 
inferior by, for example, making members of some groups ineligible for 
citizenship or to vote or by restricting the rights of members of some 
groups to make and enforce contracts.  Law can also stigmatize a group 
by criminalizing conduct that is common to or associated with a group.  
 
each other.  Id. 
300. See id. at 92 (explaining that groups built on “gender, race, class, sexuality, and 
ability” are best categorized at “structural”); cf. also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of 
What?, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  237, 241–45 (Robert Post 
& Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (discussing how racial and ethnic categories “Asian” and 
“Hispanic” or “Latino” in particular apply to people who come from different cultural 
backgrounds and who may feel little or no cultural affiliation with one another). 
301. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 92. 
302. Cf. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 434 (arguing that “[l]aw's 
entrenchment of sexual orientation as a totalizing social trait” forged a group among women 
and men who “had little in common with” each other “except by operation of law and social 
attitudes”).  Much the same can be said about law’s treatment of persons with disabilities as 
persons with physical disabilities, mental disabilities, and mental illnesses that have little in 
common other than their experiences of segregation and stigmatization. 
303. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 101. 
304. K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and 
Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 
149, 155 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
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The effect of such criminal laws can sweep far beyond individual 
lawbreakers and the prohibited action.  They often stigmatize (and 
effectively criminalize) the traits associated with the propensity to 
commit the unlawful act. 
The concept of structural groups avoids some of the problems 
discussed above that beset other attempts to define groups.  It is 
consistent with the concept of structural groups for someone to deny 
that she identifies with a group though others identify her as such.  
Consequently, the concept skirts some of the boundary issues discussed 
above because it explains when such groups exist rather than defining 
the conditions under which an individual can be said to belong to such a 
group. 
The concept of structural groups could also explain the most 
paradoxical aspect of the Court’s application of heightened rational 
basis scrutiny—its refusal to protect the most discrete and insular 
groups.305  As explained above, this practice has long stood at odds with 
the leading normative justification for the Court’s authority to negate 
duly enacted legislation—John Hart Ely’s elaboration of Chief Justice 
Stone’s footnote in Carolene Products.306  There, Ely argued that the 
Court should not negative legislation merely because a majority of 
justices believe it to be substantively unjust.307  Rather, the court should 
“intervene[] only when the ‘market,’ in our case the political market, is 
systemically malfunctioning.”308 
The substantive injustice of a law does not by itself signal a 
malfunction.  Ely argued that the political process itself must be 
unworthy of trust as well.309  Courts may negative duly enacted 
legislation when “the ins are choking off the channels of political change 
 
305. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 55.  A similar argument could possibly 
provide a general explanation for the court’s substantive due process and equal protection 
jurisprudence, too.  Professor Bill Eskridge’s articles on identity-based social movements 
(IBSMs) make a very similar argument, though Iris Marion Young’s work generally and her 
concept of structural groups in particular does not figure into his analysis.  See generally 
Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269; Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227.  Such a general 
explanation of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, however, lies beyond the 
scope of this article. 
306. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
307. See ELY, supra note 216, at 101–02 (explaining that elected representatives are 
better situated to support the “American system of representative democracy” than are life-
tenured judges). 
308. Id. at 102–03. 
309. Id. 
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to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out;” or “though no 
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an 
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out 
of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of 
interest” effectively denying the group protections that other groups 
enjoy.310 
One could argue that neither of these conditions exists with respect 
to gay men and lesbians because dozens of state legislatures and state 
courts have overturned laws that criminalize sodomy and have 
persuaded dozens of localities and several states to enact bans on sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment and housing.  Furthermore, as 
Part III.B explained, the Court has also refused to protect groups that 
meet one or both of Ely’s conditions.311  Under current doctrine, states 
may significantly restrict the civil rights of felons and ban polygamous 
marriages.  The Romer Court declared that its reasoning did not change 
these cases, though in 1996, neither of these groups had much if any 
political power.312  Members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) have chosen to live in physically 
remote and isolated places to try to fly under the radar of legal 
authorities.313  Former felons are among the most despised classes of 
people and are politically powerless; though this may be changing as 
felons have pressed for the restoration of their civil rights and have also 
begun to organize around the issue of prison rape.  
The Court’s reluctance to protect groups until they have achieved 
some political success is not as paradoxical as it may first appear.  Bill 
Eskridge has argued persuasively that extending constitutional 
protection to a discrete and insular group before it has amassed some 
outside support could be counterproductive.314  Echoing Alexander 
Bickel’s passive virtues, Professor Eskridge argues that “a judiciary that 
defies a national Kulturkampf risks institutional suicide”315 for the simple 
reason that the judiciary has to count on the other branches and on the 
 
310. Id. at 103. 
311. See supra Part III.B. 
312. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996). 
313. Scott Anderson, The Polygamists, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2010/02/polygamists/anderson-text. 
314. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note, 227 at 2372 (“Any Supreme Court decision or 
series of decisions viewed as challenging a national equilibrium in favor of a norm or against a 
despised group will be subject to likely political discipline.”). 
315. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 511. 
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states to follow its decisions.316  Constitutional protection for groups that 
are truly discrete and insular (that is, before a group has achieved some 
legislative victories or persuaded a sizeable plurality that its trait is at 
least, as Professor Eskridge puts it, “tolerable”) can backfire by 
cementing the existing and negative norms about the group.317  The 
following sections argue why courts’ use of strict scrutiny is particularly 
likely to trigger such backlash that can undo the rights that they have 
declared, while courts’ careful use of rigorous rational basis scrutiny is 
far less likely to do so. 
B. Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is Not Too Little Protection Too 
Late 
The objection that rigorous rational basis scrutiny for structural 
groups is too little protection that comes too late should be rejected.  
True—the Court will only protect such groups when they have already 
gained some political traction.318  A structural group, however, needs 
 
316. But see David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 
723, 724, 732 (2009) (arguing that the Court banks rather than spends its institutional capital 
when it invalidates the action of other branches or states and those institutions acquiesce to 
the decision).  David Law is surely right that when the Court wins, it increases its power.  See 
id.  His argument should not be construed as one that the Court should issue decisions that 
cut deep against prevailing norms.  Id. at 779–80.  (One of Professor Law’s examples is Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000)).  It is not a case, however, in which the Court’s ruling cut 
strongly against prevailing public opinion.  Half the country was happy about the result and 
everyone was relieved to have the issue settled.)  It suggests, rather, that the Court has to pick 
its battles carefully, as open defiance would certainly erode its power.  See id.  Furthermore, 
public opinion polls show that public respect for the Court has been waning in the wake of 
Bush v. Gore, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the health-care decision in 
June 2012.  See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% 
in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1 (opining that the “decline in the [C]ourt’s standing 
. . . could reflect a sense that the [C]ourt is more political, after the ideologically divided 5-to-
4 decisions in Bush v. Gore, which determined the 2000 presidential election, and Citizens 
United” in 2010); Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Public's Opinion of Supreme Court Drops 
After Health Care Law Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A21 (reporting that a majority 
of the public thought the personal or political biases of justices controlled the health-care law 
decision, not legal analysis).  These trends call Professor Law’s thesis into question. 
317. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2372 (“Any Supreme Court decision or 
series of decisions viewed as challenging a national equilibrium in favor of a norm or against a 
despised group will be subject to likely political discipline.”). 
318. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2371–72 (describing how “constitutional 
protection” is “primarily a function of the political progress a minority group has made” and 
if “socially despised and not politically organized, it will be subject to pervasive state 
segregation into inferior spheres of the culture”). 
08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
2012] LIFTING THE VEIL 431 
protection just at this point because it risks serious retribution—both 
official and unofficial—when it is publicly protesting its legal treatment 
and achieving some measure of success.  To take the most extreme 
examples, assassinations of highly visible group leaders like Martin 
Luther King Jr. and Harvey Milk unmistakably communicate to group 
members that effective, public protest of their subordinate status or 
stigmatization will meet violent backlash.319  But lesser forms of abuse—
both physical and verbal—can discourage many individuals from 
publicizing their group membership, which can make it harder for 
groups to organize to protest their inequality and amass the political 
resources necessary to mount successful legal campaigns.  Still, rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny could be too little protection—an embarrassingly 
pallid response to the mayhem of assassination and physical violence. 
But such scrutiny provides more effective protection than one might 
conclude from a simple comparison to strict scrutiny.  Rigorous rational 
basis scrutiny requires a state to clear two hurdles before it can restrict 
the rights of structural groups.320  First, the state must prove that the 
restricted activity causes some palpable harm to the property or persons 
of third parties.321  Second, the state must prove that the regulation is 
narrowly tailored to prevent that harm.322  Serious over- or under-
inclusivity dooms a regulation by creating a presumption that 
impermissible animus motivated the legislation.  Such scrutiny forbids 
majorities from legally enacting their (sometimes violent) rage and 
outrage through further, legal restrictions on a group’s rights and 
liberties. 
The Court’s focus on close fit and its insistence on evidence that 
regulations target problems of public policy prevent majorities from 
overreacting to a group’s political successes, as Coloradoans apparently 
did when gay men and lesbians secured antidiscrimination protections 
from some localities.  Furthermore, heightened scrutiny of purposeful 
 
319. Cf. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 203 (asserting that laws that criminalize 
sex with same-sex partners “reinforce” the “stigma” of being gay or lesbian, “giving 
heterosexuals official ‘permissions-to-hate’ that encourage not only police harassment but all 
manner of privately inflicted harm from insults to trashing to violence”). 
320. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 572 (1991). 
321. See id. at 569 (holding that the statute was constitutional on the sole grounds that 
promoting “order and morality” to limit the social harm of public nudity furthers a 
“substantial government interest”). 
322. See id. at 572 (upholding Indiana law on basis that it was narrowly tailored and was 
“modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State’s purpose”). 
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state attempts to disadvantage groups also sends a normative message to 
those who are outraged by a group’s visibility and political success: 
Regulations based on outrage are “irrational” animus.  Simply put, 
moral disapproval of certain groups is irrational. 
Moral judgments need not be, and often are not, rational in the 
sense of employing logic in the service of consequentialist reasoning, so 
it might seem odd to condemn straightforward moral assertions as 
irrational.  But rigorous rational basis scrutiny does not apply to private 
opinions or moral judgments, or even to moral judgments of groups such 
as a religious denomination.  It applies to public acts taken by the state.  
In effect, rigorous rational basis scrutiny requires that state action be 
minimally rational in the following sense.  The state must consider the 
effect the action will have on all members of a community.  The state 
may not justify its action solely by reference to the moral judgments of 
any given subset of the public.  The state must justify its action in terms 
of public ends, defined as ends that take into account the social 
consequences of the state action.323  By putting consequences on the 
table, rigorous rational basis scrutiny makes it coherent to talk about the 
rationality of public acts. 
Putting consequences on the table has important effects.  
Heightened rational basis scrutiny forces majorities who would restrict 
the rights of certain groups to consider and deliberate about the actual 
harms that extending those rights pose, as well as the harms the 
 
323. The Supreme Court put the point this way in Lawrence v. Texas: 
[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as 
immoral.  The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of 
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.  For many 
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted 
as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the 
course of their lives.  These considerations do not answer the question before us, 
however.  The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to 
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.  
“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” 
539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992)); cf. id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (striking down DOMA as unconstitutional because Congress justified DOMA by 
“encomia to heterosexual marriage” but offered no “increase[d] benefits to opposite-sex 
couples” and no explanation of “how denying benefits to same-sex couples will reinforce 
heterosexual marriage”). 
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restrictions inflict on the affected group.  In essence, then, heightened 
rational basis requires states to recognize that membership in a 
protected group does not affect an individual’s status as a citizen.  
Kenneth Karst has written that the principle of equal citizenship 
requires that “[e]ach individual is presumptively entitled to be treated 
by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating 
member.”324  The seemingly thin measure of constitutional protection—
the requirement that the community and state demonstrate that a 
group’s conduct harms another’s person or property—forces others to 
tolerate the groups’ existence and engage them in rational political 
debate about the costs and benefits of laws that disadvantage the 
group.325  In short, rigorous rational basis scrutiny means that in public 
dealings, group members must be treated with respect.326 
C. Inverting Carolene Does Not Pervert the Constitution 
That rigorous rational basis is effective medicine is, however, only 
half of the argument.  What justifies extending rigorous rational basis 
protection to structural groups but not to minorities, like polygamists 
and ex-cons—who are even more discrete and insular?  Moreover, 
group affiliations do not uniquely constitute identity or shape 
relationships.  Disapproval or prohibition of any activity or association 
that constitutes personal identity can also inhibit the expression of 
individual identity and connections with others.  While valid objections, 
several reasons still cut in favor of protecting the practices or traits of 
structural groups rather than participation in other disfavored activities 
that also constitute identity. 
The first is evidentiary.  Structural groups are forged through group 
protest of their subordination.  Individuals who publicly protest their 
legal subordination risk ridicule, their personal safety, prosecution, and 
retribution.  Taking such risks demonstrates that members of structural 
groups value certain rights and liberties highly and cannot tolerate the 
restrictions imposed on them. 
 
324. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 3. 
325. Cf. Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2375–76 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
scrutiny of legislation that disadvantages identity groups has facilitated healthy political 
pluralism and can be normatively justified on that basis). 
326. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 207 (noting that tolerance of a group’s 
difference “implies respect, especially in our public dealings, for the beliefs and behavior of 
individual citizens who are different from ourselves”). 
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Second, public protest also demonstrates that group members 
believe that keeping their traits, activities, or relationships with others 
private or secret is harmful or impossible.  Participating in public protest 
reveals a person’s group identity or affiliation.  Sex toy users, nudists, 
people who pay for sex and people who watch nude dancers, usually 
keep their preferences and desires private (or visible only to others 
engaged in the same behavior, such as fellow strip club patrons) rather 
than avowing them publicly.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision that the 
Constitution prohibits bans on the sale of sex toys did not spark 
jubilation.327  The California Supreme Court’s decision that marriage 
must be extended to partners of the same sex did.328  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision upholding Alabama’s ban on the sale of sex toys did 
not provoke protest marches or speeches by sex-toy users.329  The 
California Supreme Court decision upholding Proposition 8 did.330  Sex-
toy users or fetishists may be perfectly happy to disclose their desires 
only to their partners.  The illicit nature of these sexual activities may 
even be part of their allure.  While an activity may constitute a 
significant part of individual identity, it may not constitute an 
individual’s public identity.  When the state does not, as a practical 
matter, enforce restrictions on such activities when they are performed 
in private, a law’s formal illegality may not harm an individual’s identity, 
self-concept, or relationships with other people generally. 
Third, when groups organize to protest their unequal legal treatment 
and status, often their demands boil down to a claim for full and equal 
status as American citizens.  In other words, group claims to equal status 
and treatment are not claims to have separate institutions recognized; 
they are instead claims to be included in the broader legal and social 
community.  Kenneth Karst has argued that Americans’ shared identity 
 
327. Texas Ban on Sex Toy Sales Overturned, CBS NEWS (Sept. 15, 2010, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-3829467 (describing relatively muted reaction from 
opponents of the law after the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision). 
328. Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, California’s Ban on Gay Marriage is Struck 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05
prop.html. 
329. See Kim Chandler & Eric Velasco, Alabama Supreme Court Upholds Sex Toy Ban, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.al.com/birminghamnews/metro.ssf?/base/ne
ws/1252743369276790.xmlcoll=2 (failing to mention any protests to the Alabama Supreme 
Court ruling). 
330. See McKinley & Schwartz, supra note 328. 
08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
2012] LIFTING THE VEIL 435 
as citizens331 provides “at least one common ground on which all our 
subcultures can meet,” and “a community of meaning, . . . an identity, 
that overarches” our different group associations and personas.332 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny, in sum, reflects the reality that 
groups and their particular interests drive political debate and decision 
making.  This level of scrutiny recognizes that members of these groups 
have distinctive interests in relation to the practice of certain politics 
(rather than distinct in the abstract).  The practical effect of rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny is to insist that the state treat members of a group 
as equal members of the polity.333  Heightened rational basis’s strong 
rationality requirement forces those state actors who would choose to 
limit such a group’s rights and liberties to proceed cautiously and 
carefully. 
Indeed, rigorous rational basis scrutiny may be just the right level of 
protection for a structural group to proceed in its political campaign for 
acceptance.  This next section will discuss Professor Daniel Kahan’s 
work on the effectiveness of two types of policy reforms: shoves, which 
initiate large policy shifts, but which are often undone by backlash; and 
nudges, which initiate smaller policy shifts, but which can snowball into 
much larger shifts in public opinion and public policy.334  It is my 
contention that rigorous rational basis scrutiny is analogous to a nudge, 
while strict scrutiny is more like a shove. 
D. Nudges May Move Public Opinion and Public Policy Further than 
Shoves 
Daniel Kahan has argued that legal reformers should proceed 
cautiously and incrementally when public norms are not fully behind a 
particular legal change.335  Reformers should avoid abrupt, radical 
reforms of the status quo (which Professor Kahan calls “shoves”) 
because they can backfire.336  Instead, reformers who want to make big 
changes should proceed incrementally (he calls these “nudges”).337  
Nudges often encourage further legal reforms that add up over time to 
 
331. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 173. 
332. Id. 
333. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–36, 538 (1973).  
334. Kahan, supra note 44, at 608. 
335. See id. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
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large and lasting shifts in law and public opinion.338 
Professor Kahan’s main example of shoves that have backfired are 
attempts by some states to broaden rape to include date rape by 
eliminating the element of force or the “mistake of fact” defense to lack 
of consent.339  These “reforms have little effect on juries, which continue 
to treat verbal resistance [saying “no”] as equivocal evidence of 
nonconsent, or on prosecutors, who remain reluctant to press charges 
unless the victim physically resisted the man’s advances.”340  The 
reason—“genuine societal ambivalence about the ‘no sometimes means 
yes’ norm.”341  Consequently, jurors “balk[ed]” at convicting men who 
failed “to take ‘no’ at face value.”342  Prosecutors, as a result, were less 
likely to charge men of rape when they were accused of raping women 
who did not physically resist.343 
The refusal of juries to convict, and prosecutors to prosecute date 
rapists, persuades others that date rape is not morally condemnatory 
because people are influenced by others’ opinions about morality.  
Morality is dynamic—when a person sees “that a relatively large group 
of like-situated persons are engaging in a certain form of behavior, she is 
more likely to engage in that behavior, too; this increases the size of the 
group, inducing even more individuals to engage in the behavior, and so 
forth and so on.”344  Resistance to and defiance of law by legal officials, 
in other words, create feedback loops in which the refusal to prosecute 
and convict encourages others to refuse to prosecute and convict.  The 
lack of legal enforcement, in turn, fails to encourage compliance with 
the new law.  In the end, “the norm that the law is designed to 
change”—here, that no means no—“will grow in strength,” making 
future enforcement even less likely, and so on.345  Radical legal changes 
that are opposed by officials and the public entrench existing norms 
more deeply, making subsequent reform efforts even harder.346 
 
338. See id. 
339. Id. at 607. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. at 623. 
342. Id.  
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 615. 
345. Id. at 610. 
346. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–67 (1973), may be another example of a shove gone 
awry.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, has argued that the Court essentially 
wrested the issue of abortion out of the hands of legislatures, many of which were liberalizing 
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More incremental reforms—which Professor Kahan calls gentle 
nudges—may seem like weak medicine, but they can trigger an opposite 
kind of cascade effect that fundamentally changes the norms about some 
activity or the group associated with it.347  When all else is “equal, 
individuals prefer to carry out their legal obligations,” such that the 
legality or illegality of an activity modestly affects a person’s views of its 
morality.348  Consequently, legal officials will enforce laws with which 
they disagree, so long as they do not disagree too strongly.349  These 
enforcement efforts make it more likely that other officials who 
otherwise dislike the new law will also enforce and support it.350  
Furthermore, people are more likely to condemn some act that their 
peers also condemn,351 and peer opinion exerts an even greater influence 
on a person’s moral view of some act than its legal status.352  
Consequently, a modest nudge can snowball into even harsher moral 
condemnation of an act, which in turn will encourage further legal 
reforms to punish that act more harshly.353   Antismoking efforts of the 
 
or considering liberalizing existing abortion laws.  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a 
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1992).  She writes, “Around that extraordinary 
decision, a well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement rallied and succeeded, for a 
considerable time, in turning the legislative tide” toward greater abortion restrictions.  Id.  
Interestingly, the pro-life movement has been most successful when it has worked for nudges 
rather than shoves.  As William Saletan describes it, the pro-life movement has shaped public 
attitudes about whether fetuses are lives that merit legal protection.  They started small, 
pushing for legislation that permitted women to recover for injuries that caused the 
miscarriage of a child, increased penalties for violent crimes that caused a miscarriage, 
restrictions on public funding of abortion, restrictions on doctors and clinics receiving federal 
funding from discussing abortion even when asked by their patients, parental notification 
laws, and short waiting periods that purported to help women understand the risks and 
implications of abortion more fully.  See generally WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: 
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR (2004).  Individually, none of these 
directly assaulted the right to get an abortion.  Each, however, contributed either to the 
perception that fetuses were alive—human lives—or to the acceptability of restrictions on 
abortion more generally.  By 2004, Congress passed a ban on some late-term abortions even 
though other types of abortion posed greater health hazards to women.  See id. 
347. Kahan, supra note 44, at 608. 
348. Id. at 612–13. 
349. Id. at 613. 
350. Id. at 612–13 (arguing that an official is more likely to enforce a law that she 
personally finds disagreeable when other legal officials are enforcing that law). 
351. Id. at 614. 
352. Id. 
353. See id. (explaining that a modest lean in favor of one position is “likely to end up 
decidedly skewed toward that position as individuals learn how others feel and why”).  
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last several decades show how successfully nudges can change norms.  In 
the 1960s, over 40% of Americans smoked.354  Smoking was considered 
sexy and sophisticated, and people smoked everywhere—at work, in 
restaurants, bars, movie theaters, in other people’s homes, and on 
airplanes.  People even smoked around children and while pregnant.  
Nonsmokers owned ashtrays because their friends smoked.  Today, 
smoking is considered a dirty habit of poor and working-class people,355 
and only 20% of Americans smoke.356  Ashtrays are rarer than 
California condors, and no smoker would dream of lighting up in a 
friend’s house, anyway.  Smokers are pariahs in workplaces, in 
government buildings, in restaurants, and increasingly in nearly all other 
public accommodations including bars, hotel rooms, and outdoor public 
spaces.357  Pediatricians forbid smoking around children.  Woe to any 
pregnant woman who smokes in public. 
Nudges—small, incremental changes—produced this reversal in 
attitudes about and restrictions on smoking.  Federal law first required 
printed health warnings on cigarette packages in 1965 and banned 
television and radio advertisements for cigarettes in 1971.358  In 1984, 
Congress strengthened these warnings and made them more specific—
warning of the danger that smoking during pregnancy posed to 
developing fetuses, the increased risk of cancer, and the perils of 
secondhand smoke.359  During the 1980s, knowledge about the danger of 
secondhand smoke spurred restaurants to offer smoking and 
 
354. Jason Koebler, Study: Smoking Laws Prevented 800,000 Lung Cancer Deaths, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/03/14/st
udy-smoking-laws-prevented-800000-lung-cancer-deaths?vwo=501cd. 
355. Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults Aged 18 Years—United 
States, 2005–2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sep. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6035a5.htm?s_cid=%20mm6035a5.htm_w 
(explaining that smoking prevalence “generally decreased with increasing education and was 
higher among adults living below the poverty level (28.9%) than among those at or above the 
poverty level (18.3%)”). 
356. See id. (pointing to survey data to support conclusion that 19.3% of Americans 
smoke every day or some days). 
357. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 101.123 (2009–2010) (restricting smoking in public places in 
Wisconsin). 
358. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89–92, § 4, 79 Stat. 
282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)); Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat. 87, 89 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1335 (2006)).  
359. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200, 
2201–03 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)). 
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nonsmoking sections.  A cascade of restrictions soon followed.  The 
federal government banned smoking on domestic flights in 1989,360 and 
extended that ban to overseas flights in 2000.361  States passed laws 
banning smoking in restaurants and banning smoking in buildings—
pushing smokers out of doors to huddle around ashtrays.  Hotels offered 
non-smoking rooms, and many soon realized that non-smoking rooms 
were cheaper to maintain.  Now several states ban smoking in bars and 
clubs, and some localities ban smoking within twenty-five to fifty feet of 
entrances to public accommodations and buildings.362 
E. Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is a Nudge Not a Shove 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is also a nudge not a shove, though it 
operates somewhat differently than the smoking example.  Over time, 
gradually increasing restrictions on smoking reversed public attitudes 
toward smoking by making smoking more costly to engage in.  Rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny, however, does not make some behavior more 
costly.  Instead it makes legal restrictions more costly by forcing 
majorities to articulate public-regarding reasons for restricting the rights 
or privileges of groups.  Under rational basis scrutiny, “because” suffices 
as a reason.363  Rigorous rational basis requires majorities to follow the 
“because” with some reason other than the majority’s subjective 
preferences.364  Over time, forcing majorities to articulate reasons can 
dramatically change public attitudes. 
Calling rigorous rational basis scrutiny a nudge is in tension with my 
earlier analysis about rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s strength—it has 
 
360. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-164, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069, 1098–99 (codified 
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (2006)); see also Smoking Onboard Aircraft, 65 Fed. Reg. 
36,772, 36,772 (June 9, 2000) (noting that the then-current rules against smoking onboard 
aircraft were “based [on] Public Law 101-164, which was enacted in 1989”). 
361. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. 
L. No. 106-181, § 708(a), 114 Stat. 61, 159 (2000) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41706 
(2006)).   
362. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 101.123 (2009–2010) (restricting smoking in public places in 
Wisconsin). 
363. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (explaining 
that as long as the legislation could possibly be categorized as a “rational” remedy to a 
particular problem, then it survives constitutional muster under regular rational basis 
scrutiny). 
364. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that the Colorado 
constitutional amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it 
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
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proven fatal whenever the Court has used it.365  Certainly, when it comes 
to results, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is strong medicine.  It is still 
accurate to call it a nudge for two reasons.  First, compared to 
intermediate and strict scrutiny, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is a 
nudge, and I will unpack how this is true in a moment.  Furthermore, it 
is accurate to describe it as a nudge because it forces subtle shifts in the 
kinds of reasons that majorities can give for restrictions on groups. 
Rigorous rational basis nudges proponents to justify restrictions in 
terms of the tangible third-party consequences of the restricted acts and 
thus in terms of the gains to the public more generally.366  It does not 
effectively declare restrictions completely off the table.  Instead it 
requires a restriction’s proponents to show that the restricted action 
produces tangible negative consequences to third parties; if that is true, 
then a restriction benefits the general public, and it would survive 
scrutiny.367  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny could also be described as a 
kind of gentle resistance that a legal restriction must overcome.  The 
resistance can be pushed aside, but it takes some weight to move it.  To 
satisfy the standard, majorities must articulate some reason for limiting 
the liberties of some group besides the majority’s dislike of the group or 
fears about the group.368  In the absence of such reasons, rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny strikes down a particular restriction, requiring 
majorities to rethink their reasons for that restriction. 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny avoids broad principles that would 
call into question other types of restrictions.  Strict scrutiny implies, and 
intermediate scrutiny usually implies, that distinctions on the basis of 
some classification are invalid or irrelevant.  Rigorous rational basis 
does not.  It requires only that the reasons involve consequences to third 
parties rather than be based on a belief that a group exists, and a 
distaste for that fact.  One reason the Court said it would not be 
 
365. See Kahan, supra note 44, at 608. 
366. See id.  In this respect, rigorous rational basis scrutiny and smoking restrictions are 
similar.  Smoking used to be considered to be a personal choice or preference—you like to 
smoke, but I don’t, and that’s ok, much as you might like a Chevy Camaro, but I prefer the 
Volkswagen Karmann Ghia.  Mounting evidence that smoking was not merely a personal 
choice, but a behavior that endangered other, nonsmoking and non-consenting people 
probably drove many of the smoking restrictions. 
367. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (holding that the statute 
was constitutional on the sole grounds that promoting “order and morality” to limit the social 
harm of public nudity furthers a “substantial government interest”). 
368. See id. 
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applying intermediate or strict scrutiny to disability classifications in 
Cleburne was that persons with disabilities were, in their view, 
sometimes relevantly different from the able-bodied population.369  
Statutes that require states to give children with disabilities special 
educational services, for example, ought to remain constitutional and 
within the power of legislatures to grant.370 
In contrast, strict scrutiny’s presumption that race is irrelevant to 
government decision making371 imperils all classifications on the basis of 
 
369. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (asserting 
that persons with mental disabilities are “different . . . in relevant respects, and the States' 
interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one”). 
370. Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court forbade Texas from ejecting undocumented 
alien children from public schools because Texas could demonstrate no reason for doing so.  
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).  But Plyler does not force states to treat undocumented aliens the 
same in all respects as citizens and legal aliens.  Id. at 225.  Employers are generally 
prohibited from hiring undocumented aliens in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006), 
and many states deny them driver licenses, see, e.g., Heineman: State Will Defend Driver’s 
License Policy, LINCOLN J. STAR (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/state-
and-regional/govt-and-politics/heineman-state-will-defend-driver-s-license-policy/article_7e5d
d843-98e6-54d1-a875-75f441cff2d7.html (reporting on Nebraska’s policy of denying driver 
licenses to “illegal immigrants”—a policy Governor Dave Heineman said he would defend 
even after being threatened with a lawsuit by the ACLU). 
371. For example, in Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007), Justice Stevens chastised Chief Justice Roberts for insisting that all racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny when only “a few recent opinions—none of which 
even approached unanimity” support that rigid application of “strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 799–800 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens emphasized that he has “long adhered to the view 
that a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally 
different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that reason.”  Id. at 799 n.3.  
Justice Breyer agreed that race-conscious efforts to integrate schools are not subject to strict 
scrutiny under Court precedent.  Id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  As he explained in 
Parents, “A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority,” which is “accepted by every 
branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself,” 
instructs that “the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious 
criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel 
it.”  Id. at 823, 828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), Justice 
Ginsburg (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) rejected the application of strict scrutiny to 
the University of Michigan’s affirmative action plan.  Id. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Justice Ginsburg approvingly quoted Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom.  Id. at 302.  
Judge Wisdom wrote: 
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious.  To avoid conflict with the 
equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or 
imposes a burden must not be based on race.  In that sense, the Constitution is color 
blind.  But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being 
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. 
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race, including government programs designed and intended to benefit 
historically disadvantaged groups.372  (Indeed, justices who would uphold 
affirmative action have reasoned that benign discrimination such as 
affirmative action and school integration plans should be subjected to a 
lower level of scrutiny).373 
Romer and Lawrence also demonstrate the subtlety of rigorous 
rational basis’s nudge.374  Romer prohibited Colorado only from 
excluding gay men and lesbians from the regular democratic process; 
that was because Colorado offered no plausible reason for this 
restriction.375  For better or for worse, Romer did not require Colorado 
to protect gay men and lesbians from any kind of private discrimination 
or many kinds of public discrimination.376  After Romer, Colorado did 
not have to ban employment discrimination or housing discrimination or 
provide insurance to the partners of gay or lesbian employees.377  The 
only thing Romer said Colorado could not do was keep gay men and 
lesbians from using the regular political process to fight for these 
political changes.378 
Lawrence nudged a little harder by declaring that gay men and 
lesbians had a protected liberty interest of intimate, consensual sexual 
 
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 
836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).  And of course, Justices Marshall and Brennan always contended 
that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard for racial classifications designed to 
remedy racial inequality.  See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990) 
(holding that the proper constitutional inquiry for policies designed to increase racial 
diversity was whether such policies substantially furthered important government interests).   
372. Id. 
373. Id.  
374. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (incorporating Justice Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 578); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–36 (1996) (reasoning that a “desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” or a desire to “make them unequal to everyone else” because of 
“personal or religious objections to homosexuality” does not constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))); see 
also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608. 
375. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
376. See id. at 635–36 (not incorporating in its ruling that Colorado must adopt any 
additional legislation or constitutional amendments to afford homosexuals greater 
protections). 
377. See id. at 629, 635–36. 
378. See id. at 635 (reasoning that Amendment 2’s announcement that homosexuals 
shall not be protected by law fails to meet the constitutional requirement that “a law must 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose”). 
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conduct immune from state prosecution.379  But this declaration was not 
revolutionary or particularly counter-majoritarian.  The attorney 
general for the State of Texas did not even defend its anti-sodomy law in 
argument before the Court—that task fell to the district attorney of 
Harris County.380  Furthermore, the Lawrence opinion declared no new 
fundamental liberty and carefully limited the protected liberty scope.381  
This liberty protected individuals from criminal prosecution for private, 
consensual conduct between adults that causes no harm to the persons 
or property of third parties.382  (This last proviso is a definitional aspect 
of rigorous rational basis scrutiny: conduct that causes third-party harms 
to property or persons is a reason for a prohibition apart from simple 
dislike or fear of gay men and lesbians). 
F. Recent Cases Illustrating the Subtlety of Rigorous Rational Basis’s 
Nudge 
The two recent circuit court decisions regarding same-sex 
marriage—Perry v. Brown383 and Massachusetts v. United States 
Department of Health & Human Services384—also exemplify rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny’s nudge-like qualities.385  Let me begin with Perry 
 
379. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding a right to engage in sexual conduct without 
government intervention); see also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how “gentle 
nudge[s]” can snowball into consensus thought). 
380. See David Oshinsky, Strange Justice: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas, by Dale 
Carpenter, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/books/review/the-
story-of-lawrence-v-texas-by-dale-carpenter.html (revealing through a book review that the 
man “[a]rguing for Texas was Chuck Rosenthal, the flamboyant, if woefully unprepared, 
Harris County district attorney”). 
381. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though there is discussion of 
‘fundamental proposition[s],’ . . . nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual 
sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 565 (majority 
opinion))). 
382. See id. at 578. 
383. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the rational-basis 
standard to be used as “not a toothless one” with footing in the realities of the legislation), 
cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 
2012). 
384. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 
2012) (opining that the scrutiny applied in analyzing DOMA’s constitutionality should be 
something more than the ordinary deference afforded in rational basis scrutiny). 
385. William Eskridge agrees: 
As the proverbial “least dangerous branch,” the federal judiciary (headed by the 
Supreme Court) is unable, and usually unwilling, to strongly challenge entrenched 
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v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit decision that declared unconstitutional 
California Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California 
after the California Supreme Court had extended the right of marriage 
to same-sex couples.386 
The Ninth Circuit opinion is notable for what it does not do.  It does 
not say that the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage.387  
It does not say that laws that restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples 
violate the federal constitution.388  It does not say that gay men and 
lesbians are a protected class.389  It does not say that same-sex couples 
are the same as straight couples for purposes relevant to marriage.390 
The Ninth Circuit instead emphasized how unique Proposition 8 was 
among bans on same-sex marriage and, as a result, the narrowness of its 
ruling.391  Proposition 8 was unique among same-sex marriage 
restrictions, the court explained, for two reasons.392  First, it “stripped 
same-sex couples of the right to have their committed relationships 
recognized by the State with the designation of ‘marriage,’ which the 
state constitution had previously guaranteed them.”393  Second, it did so 
while leaving in place the other rights and responsibilities of domestic 
partners in California, which “are identical to those of married 
spouses.”394  By doing so, Proposition 8, like Colorado’s Amendment 2, 
“‘carves out’ an ‘exception’ to California’s equal protection clause, by 
 
inequalities in this country.  Judges may be willing to nudge the country in the right 
direction, but rarely do they give a hard shove until the balance of antiminority 
prejudice and prominority sympathy has shifted toward the latter. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitutional Politics of 
Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 96 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordla
wreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-93.pdf. 
386. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096. 
387. See id. at 1082 (declining to rule on whether same-sex couples possessed a 
fundamental right to marriage under the federal constitution). 
388. Id. (refusing to decide whether permitting opposite-sex couples to marry while 
denying same-sex couples from marrying violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
389. Id. at 1101 (“A classification ‘neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding 
along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.’”). 
390. Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Same-sex 
couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the characteristics relevant to the ability to 
form successful marital unions.”). 
391. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064. 
392. See id. at 1076. 
393. Id. 
394. Id.  
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removing equal access to marriage, which gay men and lesbians had 
previously enjoyed, from the scope of that constitutional guarantee.”395 
The Ninth Circuit thus framed the question narrowly: could a 
majority withdraw “a privilege or protection . . . from a class of 
disfavored individuals, even if that right may not have been required by 
the Constitution in the first place”?396  The answer to that question was 
no, as Proposition 8’s defenders had produced no evidence that same-
sex marriage undermined the institution of marriage.397  The Ninth 
Circuit observed that rational basis is “deferential” but not 
“toothless.”398  “[E]ven the standard of rationality . . . must find some 
footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.”399 
The Ninth Circuit’s grounds for why Proposition 8 failed rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny were also narrow.  Proposition 8’s proponents 
argued that Proposition 8 “advances California’s interest in responsible 
procreation and childrearing.”400  The Ninth Circuit steered clear of 
branding the position that opposite-sex couples make better parents 
than same-sex parents as irrational, meritless, or unsupported.401  “We 
need not decide whether there is any merit to the sociological premise of 
Proponents’ first argument—that families headed by two biological 
parents are the best environments in which to raise children . . . .”402  
Instead, the court observed, 
Proposition 8 in no way modified the state’s laws governing 
 
395. Id. at 1081. 
396. Id. at 1085. 
397. Proposition 8’s proponents produced no evidence at trial that same-sex marriage 
undermined the institution of marriage.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921, 
949 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that an expert for Proposition 8’s proponents testified that 
“recognizing same-sex marriage will lead to the deinstitutionalization of marriage” but cited 
no evidence and gave no reasons for this conclusion).  The only evidence at trial suggested 
that same-sex marriage did not affect marriage or divorce rates.  Id. at 972 (citing testimony 
from plaintiffs’ expert witness that “[d]ata from Massachusetts on the ‘annual rates for 
marriage and for divorce’ for ‘the four years prior to same-sex marriage being legal and the 
four years after’ show ‘that the rates of marriage and divorce are no different after [same-sex] 
marriage was permitted than they were before’” (second alteration in original)). 
398. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). 
399. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)). 
400. Id. at 1086. 
401. It appears that the Proposition’s defenders presented little evidence on this point.  
See Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. at 944, 948–49 (explaining that the expert witness’s 
conclusions were “unsupported by evidence” and therefore were rejected). 
402. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1086. 
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parentage, which are distinct from its laws governing marriage.  
. . .  In order to be rationally related to the purpose of funneling 
more childrearing into families led by two biological parents, 
Proposition 8 would have had to modify these laws in some way.  
It did not do so.403 
On this point, the court could rely on what Proposition 8’s 
proponents had written for the official voter guide’s explanation of 
Proposition 8: “Proposition 8 doesn’t take away any rights or benefits of 
gay or lesbian domestic partnerships.  Under California law, ‘domestic 
partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits’ as married 
spouses.  (Family Code § 297.5.)  There are NO exceptions.  Proposition 
8 WILL NOT change this.”404 
The court’s decision rested on the uniqueness of California law and 
Proposition 8.  It is not that gay men and lesbians have a right to same-
sex marriage.  Rather, California law had given them the right to marry, 
and Proposition 8 took it away.  Under Romer, the Court emphasized: 
[I]t is no justification for taking something away to say that there 
was no need to provide it in the first place; instead, there must be 
some legitimate reason for the act of taking it away, a reason that 
overcomes the “inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons 
affected.”405 
Here the court relies on common sense: people feel losses more 
keenly than foregone gains.406  Not landing a job may feel bad, but 
 
403. Id. at 1086–87. 
404. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 56 (2008), available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/argu-rebut/pdf/prop8-a-and-r.pdf.  According to the 
California Department of State website, arguments for and against ballot measures are 
written by the measure’s proponents and opponents.  See Official Voter Information Guide: 
About Ballot Arguments, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE (last visited Dec. 9, 2012), 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-info/about-ballot-arguments.htm. 
405. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
406. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 306 (2011) (describing 
studies that demonstrate that people judge losses based on reference points, such that the 
“existing wage, price, or rent sets a reference point, which has the nature of an entitlement 
that must not be infringed”); id. at 304 (“If you are set to look for it, the asymmetric intensity 
of the motives to avoid losses and to achieve gains shows up almost everywhere.”); Henry J. 
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975) (“And whatever the 
mathematics, there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what 
one wants.”). 
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getting laid off or fired feels worse. 
Furthermore, even after Proposition 8, California law guaranteed 
gay men and lesbians who were registered domestic partners all of the 
same rights and obligations as married couples.407  The only work 
Proposition 8 did was to deny the name of marriage to these same-sex 
relationships that were in all substantive respects “marriage.”408  As the 
Ninth Circuit put it, “[o]nly the designation of ‘marriage’ is withdrawn 
and only from one group of individuals.”409 
The logic of rigorous rational basis and these unique facts make 
Perry a clear but quite limited holding, and thus a nudge.410  Perry 
announces no broad principles that could extend its reach to other 
cases.411  The Court’s reasoning, based on rigorous rational basis 
scrutiny, does not imply, as arguments based on strict scrutiny would, 
that same-sex couples are the same as straight couples.412  Nor does 
Perry imply that no reasons exist for distinguishing same-sex couples 
from their opposite-sex counterparts.413  Rather, Perry’s point is that 
these defendants failed to prove such a case.414  At trial, Proposition 8’s 
proponents called only a couple of witnesses.415  The expert produced by 
the proponents testified that it was his opinion that same-sex marriage 
would undermine the institution of marriage more generally, but he 
produced no evidence to support this opinion and did not engage 
plaintiff’s evidence to the contrary.416 
Perry’s reach is limited in one other respect.  It will only affect 
California, and in the four years since voters passed Proposition 8, 
Californians’ views have swung in favor of same-sex marriage.  A 2012 
 
407. The Ninth Circuit wrote, “Proposition 8 in no way alters the state laws that govern 
childrearing and procreation.”  Perry, 671 F.3d at 1088.  It reasoned, “As before Proposition 
8, those laws apply in the same way to same-sex couples in domestic partnerships and to 
married couples.  Only the designation of ‘marriage’ is withdrawn and only from one group of 
individuals.”  Id. 
408. See id. 
409. Id. 
410. See id. at 1096. 
411. Id. 
412. See id. at 1082 (declining to consider whether same-sex couples have a fundamental 
right to marry). 
413. Id. 
414. See id. at 1096 (holding that California failed to offer a legitimate reason for 
Proposition 8).  
415. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944 (N.D. Cal. 2010).   
416. Id. at 949. 
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Field Poll estimates that 59% of California voters now favor permitting 
same-sex partners to marry on the same terms as straight couples, with 
only 34% against.417  However, once Perry is finally resolved, gay men 
and lesbians in California will soon have the same right to marry as 
opposite-sex couples.418 
The First Circuit’s declaration that the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act violated the Equal Protection Clause can also be described as a 
nudge.419  Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health & Human 
Services, like Perry, takes a conservative, minimalist approach in ruling 
unconstitutional federal DOMA’s exclusion of valid same-sex marriages 
from the federal definition of marriage.420  That provision prohibits 
same-sex married couples from filing joint tax returns, denies same-sex 
surviving spouses social security benefits, and denies federal workers 
dependent medical care benefits for their same-sex spouses.421  
(DOMA’s other provision,422 which “absolves states from recognizing 
same-sex marriages solemnized in other states” was not at issue in the 
case.423) 
The First Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, applied rigorous rational 
basis scrutiny and required “that the federal government interest in” 
enacting DOMA “be shown with special clarity.”424  The First Circuit, 
like the Ninth Circuit, also steered clear of broad principles that would 
commit it to results in future cases.  It explicitly sidestepped declaring 
that gay men and lesbians are a suspect class, reasoning that there is no 
precedent for it to do so.425  Romer, it says, would have been the natural 
place for the Court to declare gay men and lesbians a suspect class, and 
 
417. Press Release, Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, The Field Poll, Big Increase in 
California Voters Who Favor Allowing Same-Sex Marriage: Six in Ten (59%) Now Approve 
(Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Field Poll], available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers
/Rls2406.pdf. 
418. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096 (holding Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional). 
419. See Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how “gentle nudge[s]” can snowball 
into consensus thought). 
420. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that it is not necessary to develop a new “suspect classification” for 
homosexuals). 
421. Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6;  
422. Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).  
423. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6. 
424. Id. at 10. 
425. Id. at 9. 
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Romer “conspicuously” did not.426  Earlier First Circuit precedent has 
also held that gay men and lesbians are not a suspect class.427  (In a slip 
that reveals the First Circuit’s conservatism, the First Circuit refers to 
sexual orientation as “sexual preference.”428) 
The court’s concern about a 1972 Supreme Court precedent, Baker 
v. Nelson, also demonstrates how conservative a nudge this decision is.429  
In Baker, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection 
challenge to Minnesota’s refusal to marry same-sex partners.430  In the 
First Circuit’s view, Baker’s summary dismissal foreclosed certain bases 
for the First Circuit decision.431  Baker prevented it from declaring gay 
men and lesbians to be a “suspect” class, because suspect status would 
call into question all state bans on same-sex marriage.432  Baker also kept 
the First Circuit from declaring that same-sex partners have any federal 
constitutional right to marry. 
The First Circuit’s avoidance of heightened scrutiny is particularly 
noteworthy because the Justice Department had refused to defend 
DOMA and had urged the court to apply heightened scrutiny to find 
DOMA unconstitutional.433  The Justice Department’s position certainly 
gave the First Circuit political cover to write a broader opinion than it 
ultimately did.  (That there was any controversy at all was due to the 
fact that the First Circuit permitted some members of Congress to 
intervene to defend DOMA.434)  The court’s refusal to step into a 
 
426. Id. 
427. Id. (citing to Cook v. Gates 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008)) (reasoning that Cook 
“has already declined to create a major new category of ‘suspect classification’ for statutes 
distinguishing based on sexual preference”). 
428. Id. 
429. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (summarily dismissing equal 
protection appeal for “want of substantial federal question”); Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 
(explaining how “gentle nudge[s]” can snowball into consensus thought). 
430. See Baker, 409 U.S. at 810; see also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how 
“gentle nudge[s]” may sometimes snowball into consensus thought if institutional actors don’t 
perceive it as a threat). 
431. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8 (“Baker does not resolve our own case but it does limit 
the arguments to ones that do not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage.”); see also id. at 9 (reasoning that “to create such a new suspect classification for 
same-sex relationships would have far-reaching implications—in particular, by implying an 
overruling of Baker, which we are neither empowered to do nor willing to predict”). 
432. Id. at 9–10. 
433. Id. at 7. 
434. Id. 
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political dispute between some members of Congress and the Executive 
Branch shows the court’s desire not to get out ahead of public opinion. 
In the end, DOMA still failed the weaker standard of rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny.  According to the First Circuit, the rigorous 
rational basis line of cases discussed in Part II required it to 
“undertake[] a more careful assessment of the justifications than the 
light scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review.”435  
Members of Congress justified DOMA on three grounds:436 first, 
“preserving scarce government resources”; second, “defending and 
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage”; and 
third, “defending traditional notions of morality.”437  None of these 
reasons satisfied rigorous rational basis scrutiny. 
Cost savings could not justify DOMA.  While Congress may have 
believed that DOMA would save the government money, the First 
Circuit held that “detailed recent analysis indicates that DOMA is more 
likely on a net basis to cost the government money.”438  Under regular 
rational basis, the actual facts would not matter—Congress’s assertion 
that DOMA would save it money supported by logical reasoning would 
be just fine.  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny required Congress to get its 
math right.  The actual facts on the ground contradicted Congress’s 
reasoning and undermined DOMA.439 
Nor could “defending and nurturing the institution of traditional, 
heterosexual marriage” justify DOMA.440  The First Circuit handled its 
rejection of this reason gently.  Congress, according to the court, failed 
to produce evidence to support the “connection between DOMA’s 
treatment of same-sex couples and its asserted goal of strengthening the 
bonds and benefits to society of heterosexual marriage.”441  The First 
Circuit might have said that the connection between the two was 
irrational or implausible.  But like the Ninth, it avoided hyperbole and 
stuck to stating mildly that DOMA’s defenders had not shown a link.442 
 
435. Id. at 11.   
436. There was a possible fourth—protecting state sovereignty—but the First Circuit 
held that it only served as a justification for DOMA’s other section.  State sovereignty would 
in fact cut in favor of federal recognition of valid state marriages.  See id. at 14. 
437. Id. at 14. 
438. Id.  
439. Id. 
440. Id. at 14–15. 
441. Id. at 15. 
442. Id. 
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In rejecting the third reason, the court simply said that rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny rules out moral objections toward gay men and 
lesbians as a justification for DOMA and cited Lawrence and Romer.443  
Once more revealing the mild nudge of rigorous rational basis scrutiny, 
the First Circuit took pains to avoid besmirching DOMA’s proponents.  
“In reaching our judgment, we do not rely upon the charge that 
DOMA’s hidden but dominant purpose was hostility to 
homosexuality.”444  Wanting to preserve the institution of marriage in its 
traditional form “is not the same as ‘mere moral disapproval of an 
excluded group,’”445 so DOMA’s proponents are not necessarily bigots 
or hostile to gay men and lesbians.  “Traditions are the glue that holds 
society together, and many of our own traditions rest largely on belief 
and familiarity—not on benefits firmly provable in court.”446  
Nevertheless, however sincerely and benignly held, moral preferences 
do not satisfy rigorous rational basis scrutiny. 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s gentleness is its strength because it 
can change policies while running a lower risk of backlash than strict 
scrutiny.  Two other decisions that used strict scrutiny to declare 
unconstitutional bans on same-sex marriage show how backlash can 
undo strong constitutional protections. 
G. Strict Scrutiny Is a Shove That Can Provoke Backlash That Negates 
Constitutional Protection 
The virtues of nudges also can be perceived by contrasting decisions 
that nudge with those that shove.  Strict scrutiny often leads courts to 
issue opinions that signal, in substance and possibly in form, that certain 
types of decisions are simply beyond the power of even overwhelming 
majorities.  Such decisions can lead members of such majorities to feel 
that they have been excluded from the democratic process even though, 
being in the majority, they hold what usually is the trump card for that 
process.  That sense of exclusion is different from the exclusion felt by 
members of groups who receive no protection from majorities 
whatsoever, but it can prompt the same desire to find a way to reclaim a 
seat at the policy table. 
Let us first consider the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in 
 
443. Id. 
444. Id. at 16. 
445. Id. at 16 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)).  
446. Id. 
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Baehr v. Lewin, which held that Hawaii’s ban on same-sex marriage 
likely violated the state’s equal protection clause.447  The Hawaii 
Supreme Court held that the restriction on same-sex marriage was sex 
discrimination.448  Under the Hawaii constitution sex discrimination was 
subject to strict scrutiny, so the state had to justify its ban on same-sex 
marriage under that stringent standard.449  The Hawaii Supreme Court 
indicated that the State’s arguments would likely fail that standard.450  
Without ruling on the merits, the Court deemed the State’s argument—
that it was preserving the traditional nature of marriage—“circular and 
unpersuasive.”451  In the Court’s view, the State’s reasoning resembled 
that which the Supreme Court had rejected in Loving v. Virginia.452  As 
the Hawaii Supreme Court presaged, the trial court that heard Baehr on 
remand ruled in 1996 that the State had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.453  
The Hawaii Supreme Court summarily affirmed.454  Thus, Hawaii’s ban 
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. 
But the Hawaii courts were not the last word on the matter by a long 
shot.  The Baehr decision sent shockwaves throughout the country.455  In 
1996, conservatives began a “campaign[] across the nation to insure that 
the recognition of same-sex marriages would not spread to other 
states.”456  “So great was aversion to the . . . Hawaii ruling that Congress 
passed—and President Clinton signed—the Defense of Marriage Act” 
in 1996 “granting states the right to refuse to recognize same-sex 
 
447. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that its decision is in complete 
harmony with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and that, on remand, the statute must 
survive the strict scrutiny standard of proving both a “compelling state interest[]” and that the 
statute is “narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights”). 
448. Id. at 64 (finding that the statute, “on its face and as applied, regulates access to the 
marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex”). 
449. Id. at 68.   
450. See id. at 67 (explaining that the statute is presumed to be unconstitutional unless 
Hawaii can overcome the high hurdle of showing that the statute is justified by “compelling 
state interests” and is “narrowly drawn” to avoid infringing on constitutional rights). 
451. Id. at 61. 
452. Id. at 63. 
453. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).  
454. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
455. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, 
Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2009). 
456. Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index.html 
(last updated Nov. 13, 2012). 
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marriages from other states.”457  In Hawaii, voters overwhelmingly 
approved of a constitutional amendment458 permitting the legislature to 
ban same-sex marriage.459  Other states followed suit.460  In 1996 and 1997 
alone, twenty-five states passed legislation defining marriage as a 
relationship between a man and a woman.461  “By the time the Baehr v. 
Lewin litigation came to an end in 1998, thirty-one states had enacted 
laws to prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages.”462  To be sure, 
few supposed that same-sex marriage had been permissible in these 
states or recognized by the federal government before the flurry of 
state-level DOMAs.  Yet, the stamp of disapproval sent by strong 
majorities at the state and federal levels created a firm baseline against 
same-sex marriage. 
The 2008 California Supreme Court decision that gay men and 
lesbians had a constitutional right to same-sex marriage appears to have 
provoked backlash that undid its work almost immediately.463  Like the 
Hawaii courts, the California Supreme Court also applied strict scrutiny, 
but for different reasons.  It ruled that gay men and lesbians were a 
suspect classification.464  Sexual orientation was a suspect category 
because it is “associated with a stigma of inferiority and second class 
citizenship, manifested by the group’s history of legal and social 
disabilities”;465 “sexual orientation is a characteristic . . . that bears no 
 
457. Miranda Ewell, Gay-Marriage Ruling Ups the Ante, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Dec. 5, 1996, at 27A. 
458. See 1998 General Elections Precinct Report, STATE OF HAWAII, 4 (Nov. 3, 1998), 
http://hawaii.gov/elections/results/1998/general/98swgen.htm (reporting results of 69.2% in 
favor, 28.6% against). 
459. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.”). 
460. See State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. 
LIFE (Jul. 9, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-Homosexuality/State-
Policies-on-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (showing increase in states with constitutional 
amendments banning gay marriage from 1998–2008).   
461. Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to 
Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 704, 725 n.163 (2011). 
462. Id. at 725 n.163, 726 (listing states that had adopted state bans on same-sex 
marriage). 
463. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5;  see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 
2008) (holding that limiting marriage to “between a man and a woman” is unconstitutional), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
464. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401. 
465. Id. at 442. 
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relation to a person’s ability to perform or contribute to society”;466 and, 
though the court hesitated to deem it immutable, it was sufficiently 
fundamental to a person’s identity that one should not be required to 
disavow it.467 
Additionally, the California Supreme Court also held that 
California’s domestic partnership statute violated same-sex couples’ 
fundamental right to marry.468  Though same-sex domestic partners had 
all of the same substantive rights of married couples, the court held, 
[A]ffording same-sex couples access only to the separate 
institution of domestic partnership, and denying such couples 
access to the established institution of marriage, . . . imping[es] 
upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship 
accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family 
relationship of opposite-sex couples.469 
Notice how powerfully the California Supreme Court declares the 
rights of gay men and lesbians to marry.  First, discrimination against 
gay men and lesbians is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex (which under California law also received strict scrutiny), 
religion, or national origin.  Sexual orientation is an irrelevant basis for 
legislation save extraordinary circumstances.470  Second, gay men and 
lesbians had a fundamental right to marry in California.471  
Consequently, restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation or on the 
right to marry would have to satisfy strict scrutiny.472 
This right to marry was very broad indeed.  The California law that 
the Court declared unconstitutional had actually given same-sex 
relationships all of the same substantive rights and obligations as 
marriage.473  The domestic partnership statutes declared that every 




468. Id. at 446 (holding that “the relevant statutes significantly impinge upon the 
fundamental interests of same-sex couples”). 
469. Id. at 445. 
470. Id. at 442–43.  
471. Id. at 446; see supra text accompanying notes 468. 
472. See id. at 401. 
473. California made domestic partner rights equivalent to marriage beginning January 
1, 2005, with the enactment of CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).   
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read as referring to domestic partners.474  That was not good enough to 
satisfy strict scrutiny. 
If this domestic partnership law could not survive strict scrutiny, no 
differentiation between same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships could.  
Calling same-sex relationships “domestic partnership[s]” rather than 
marriage denied same-sex couples’ fundamental rights because some 
name other than “marriage” “cast[s] doubt on” the equal dignity of 
same-sex couples and their families.475  Denying same-sex couples 
“access to the familiar and highly favored designation of marriage” 
implied “an official view that their committed relationships are of lesser 
stature than the comparable relationships of opposite-sex couples,”476 
when the law demands that they be treated with equal dignity.  Calling 
same-sex partnerships by a different, unfamiliar name denied same-sex 
couples the “assurance” that married couples enjoyed “that the 
government will enforce the mutual obligations between the partners 
(and to their children) that are an important aspect of the commitments 
upon which the relationship rests.”477 
The breadth of the California Supreme Court’s holding apparently 
frightened some California voters.  Immediately in the wake of the 
decision, polls suggested that a bare majority of the public supported 
same-sex marriage—51% of Californians approved same-sex marriage, 
42% opposed it, and 7% were undecided.478  But by November 2008, the 
California Supreme Court decision seemed to have turned undecided 
Californians against same-sex marriage, along with some voters who had 
previously said they favored same-sex marriage.479  The breadth and 
strength of the California Supreme Court’s decision let Proposition 8’s 
supporters argue that the court had made a personal moral issue—
beliefs about the acceptability of same-sex marriage—into a legal 
issue.480  The amendment’s supporters argued that the California 
Supreme Court’s decision would require schools to teach children that 
same-sex marriage and gay or lesbian families were no different than 
 
474. Id. § 297.5(e).  
475. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400–01. 
476. Id. at 401–02. 
477. Id. at 427. 
478. Field Poll, supra note 417, at tbl.1. 
479. See id. at tbl.3. 
480. See Eskridge, supra note 385, at 93. 
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traditional marriage and families.481  Behind the hyperbole lay a grain of 
truth.  The California Supreme Court had left no doubt that the state 
must treat these relationships exactly the same.  Others worried that 
churches, as public accommodations, would have to accept gay men and 
lesbians as members and perhaps even perform same-sex marriage 
ceremonies.482  Ultimately, 52% of voters voted to ban same-sex 
marriage.483 
Contrast In re Marriage Cases and Baehr with the much narrower 
holdings of Perry and Massachusetts.  Neither Perry nor Massachusetts 
said that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, or that gay men 
and lesbians had a fundamental right to marry.484  Instead, both courts 
said that the government had not shown that the legal restrictions on 
gay men and lesbians had a rational relationship to some legitimate 
interest apart from morality.485  Consequently, the government had to 
revisit the issue to try to articulate some reason besides moral 
disapproval of same-sex marriages. 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny leaves majorities some breathing 
room to reconsider their desire to discriminate against a group.  
Consequently it is less likely to produce backlash than strict scrutiny.486  
In re Marriage Cases and Baehr left no doubt that in California and 
Hawaii any majoritarian attempts to treat gay men and lesbians 
differently than heterosexuals were completely off the table.  Drastic 
measures—constitutional bans against same-sex marriage—were the 
only option.  Perry and Massachusetts appear to have sparked no 
backlash. 
That breathing room may make it possible for majorities to change 
 
481. Id. 
482. See Neil J. Young, Equal Rights, Gay Rights and the Mormon Church, N.Y. TIMES 
CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Jun. 13, 2012, 11:05 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2
012/06/13/equal-rights-gay-rights-and-the-mormon-church/. 
483. Tamara Audi et al., California Set to Join Trend of Banning Gay Marriage, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at A10. 
484. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012); see also 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).  
485. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 15; Perry, 671 F.3d at 1092–93.  
486. It would be ludicrous to claim that the average, lay voter differentiates between 
“strict scrutiny” and “rigorous rational basis” scrutiny.  Do not mistake me as making that 
claim.  Instead, I am making a more modest one—that voters can tell the difference between 
a very broad declaration of rights and more modest push back from courts to reconsider the 
reasons for legislation. 
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their minds about the equality of previously subordinated groups.  
Interestingly, once a majority of Californians had voted to ban same-sex 
marriage, they appeared to be able to reconsider the issue.  Not quite 
four years after Proposition 8 passed, 59% of Californians now support 
same-sex marriage, more than in 2008.487  Importantly, only 34% are 
against it, with 7% undecided.488  This polling data was gathered after 
Perry, which supports the idea that rigorous rational basis ruffles fewer 
feathers. 
Perry and Massachusetts show how rigorous rational basis scrutiny 
operates as a nudge, particularly as compared to more heavy-handed 
intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis.489  As these cases show, rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny requires majorities to articulate public-regarding 
reasons for restrictions on groups.  Under rational basis scrutiny, 
“because” suffices as a reason.490  Rigorous rational basis requires 
majorities to follow the “because” with some reason other than the 
majority’s subjective preferences.  Over time, forcing majorities to 
articulate reasons can dramatically change public attitudes. 
H. Conclusion: Nudges from Courts Can Be More Powerful than Shoves 
At first glance, rigorous rational basis scrutiny might look like too 
little protection for groups from the courts too late, but that first 
impression is wrong.  This section has argued that rigorous rational basis 
is indeed just the right tool for helping groups to integrate into and gain 
acceptance from the larger democratic community.  It requires 
majorities to treat minority groups as members of the democratic 
community and to articulate reasons to justify treating those group 
members differently.  As Perry and Massachusetts show, rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny permits courts to decide particular cases without 
declaring broad principles that would commit them to declaring broader 
 
487. Field Poll, supra note 417, at tbl.1. 
488. Id. 
489. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (describing the rational-basis standard to be used as not 
toothless with some footing in the realities of the legislation); see also Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 
at 15 (opining that the scrutiny applied in analyzing DOMA’s constitutionality should be 
something more than the ordinary deference afforded in rational basis scrutiny). 
490. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 139 (1990) (“The first principle” of the American constitutional system “is self-
government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish, 
simply because they are majorities.”).  
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rights in later cases.491  Two other cases, Baehr and In re Marriage Cases 
show how strict scrutiny is a bigger, blunter tool that appears to be more 
protective of groups’ rights.492  Strict scrutiny’s strength can undermine 
its effectiveness because it can provoke backlash from majorities who 
reject the implication that the protected group is for all intents and 
purposes identical to the members of the majority.  In contrast, rigorous 
rational basis’s modesty is less likely than strict scrutiny to provoke 
backlash from those opposed to a group’s agenda.  Ultimately, it can 
therefore promote greater progress in a group’s bid for tolerance and 
acceptance as full-fledged members of the political community. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
In a wide range of cases the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
applied a middle tier level of scrutiny—rigorous rational basis—to 
protect some groups from attempts by majorities to restrict the liberties 
of such groups based on dislike for or moral disapproval of such groups.  
Despite its ubiquity, the Court has often denied that this mid-level 
scrutiny exists and has never developed criteria for determining when 
rigorous rational basis scrutiny will apply. 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny should be applied to protect 
“structural” groups from discrimination and describes criteria for 
identifying when a structural group exists and should be entitled to 
constitutional protection. 
One frequent criticism of extending constitutional protection to 
groups as opposed to prohibiting certain general classifications is that 
group protection will promote group separatism as opposed to 
assimilation into the larger American culture.  Separatism in turn, goes 
the argument, kindles identity politics with different groups competing 
for their share of political goodies rather than being interested in 
policies that promote the broader good.  On this view, some groups’ 
entitlement to affirmative action encouraged people to identify more 
strongly as members of those groups and to fight for stronger 
affirmative action programs, despite the costs to other minority groups 
 
491. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8 (explaining that precedent does not “mandate[] 
that the Constitution requires states to permit same-sex marriages”); Perry, 671 F.3d at 1082. 
492. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “statutes 
imposing differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation” are constitutional suspect), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 67 (Haw. 1993). 
08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:28 PM 
2012] LIFTING THE VEIL 459 
(such as Asian Americans) who did not benefit under affirmative-action 
programs.  Denying Asian Americans status as affirmative-action 
beneficiaries, in turn, galvanized Asian Americans either to fight against 
affirmative-action policies or for beneficiary status.  Lost in the jostle 
over the spoils for preferences was measured consideration of the 
wisdom or utility of affirmative-action policies more generally in 
promoting the broader societal good. 
As the analysis in Part IV suggests, the Court’s use of rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny to shield some groups from legislation based on 
dislike or moral disapproval of a group is unlikely to spur divisive 
identity politics, promote separatism, or weaken American national 
identity.493  When groups insist on equal treatment under the law, they 
are not petitioning for separation from American legal and community 
institutions.  They petition, instead, for inclusion in and equal treatment 
by those institutions,494 and that is what rigorous rational basis 
guarantees to them.  Indeed, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is likely to 
produce quite the opposite effect.  Rigorous rational basis scrutiny 
protects and strengthens democracy and common national identity by 
reducing individual group members’ need for a distinct and separate 
group identity.495  The converse, in fact, is far more likely.  Just as one 
 
493. Iris Marion Young argued that  
Paying specific attention to differentiated social groups in democratic discussion and 
encouraging public expression of their situated knowledge thus often makes it more 
possible than it would otherwise be for people to transform conflict and 
disagreement into agreement.  Speaking across differences in a context of public 
accountability often reduces mutual ignorance about one another’s situations, or 
misunderstanding of one another’s values, intentions, and perceptions, and gives 
everyone the enlarged thought necessary to come to more reasonable and fairer 
solutions to problems. 
YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 118; see also id. at 82 (“I argue that political claims 
asserted from the specificity of social group position, and which argue that the polity should 
attend to these social differences, often serve as a resource for . . . democratic communication 
that aims at justice.”); id. at 82, 225 (arguing that attending to group inequalities and 
recognizing group identity facilitates the democratic engagement by transcending grudging 
willingness to let others alone and creating an opportunity for others to listen to and engage 
with each other). 
494. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 486 (arguing that “[l]ike the due 
process and speech cases, the equal protection cases were a tacit concession by potential 
rebels that they wanted to remain part of the pluralist constitutional polity”). 
495. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 97 (“Most often, when individual men and 
women insist on ‘being themselves,’ they are in fact defending a self they share with others.” 
(quoting Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY 
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has less need to march to protest mistreatment the law already forbids, 
the less society insists that a particular fact about you defines you, the 
less defining that fact will seem to be in your daily routine.  Legal 
recognition and protection of groups reduces the necessity of group 
identity to its members and facilitates their integration in to the broader 
community.496 
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is an appropriate level of scrutiny to 
promote a group’s inclusion as it is less likely to spark political backlash 
against a group’s court victories than stricter constitutional scrutiny.  In 
short, it is a nudge, not a shove.  Unlike strict scrutiny, it does not 
declare as a matter of constitutional law that group membership is 
irrelevant to government decision making.  It does, however, require a 
reason for limiting the liberties of some group besides the majority’s 
dislike of the group or fears about the group.  In the absence of such 
reasons, rigorous rational basis scrutiny strikes down a particular 
restriction.  The ball is then back in the majority’s court to rethink their 
reasons for that restriction to determine if there are any reasons besides 
fear or dislike and reconsider their desire to discriminate against a 
group.  Ultimately, the nudge of rigorous rational basis scrutiny can be 
just as if not more effective a tool for securing the equality of a group 
because it forces a majority to grapple with the reasons why it wants to 
treat some groups differently. 
 
 
CULTURES 139, 146 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995)). 
496. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 96 (“When the enforced separation of a . . . 
minority ends, and its members come to participate in the activities and institutions of the 
wider society, their participation itself promotes assimilation.”). 
